The newer Sunriver Long Fund family adds a second strategic branch. Sunriver Long Fund LP was launched in 2022 and had approximately $52.1 million of cumulative Form D sales by the latest 2026-linked data. Sunriver Long Fund Ltd., the Cayman counterpart, dates to 2020 and has approximately $157 million of cumulative offering sales in public filing records.
The existence of a separate Long Fund strongly suggests Sunriver can deliver a different net-exposure profile for investors who want the manager's stock selection without the same short book or hedge structure as the flagship. Public Form D data does not fully define the mandate, however, so FilingDossier should avoid describing the Long Fund as strictly long-only unless current offering documents explicitly say so.
This fund family also creates allocation questions. If Cook identifies a highly attractive long idea, investors should understand how the position is divided between flagship and Long Fund accounts. A stock can be suitable for both. The adviser should therefore maintain written allocation procedures designed to prevent one vehicle from systematically receiving better prices or more attractive capacity than another.
FUNDAMENTAL EQUITY STRATEGY: WHY THE UNDER-$25-BILLION UNIVERSE MATTERS
Sunriver's investment universe is notably narrower than that of a broad global equity hedge fund. The manager says it focuses on companies with market capitalizations below approximately $25 billion.
This creates several potential advantages.
Companies below the mega-cap tier generally receive less analyst attention than the largest technology and financial companies. Their shareholder bases can also be less efficient, particularly when a company is misunderstood because of temporary operational problems, corporate transitions, industry complexity or limited investor relations coverage.
Smaller companies can have longer growth runways. A $5 billion company that executes successfully can potentially become a $20 billion business; a $3 trillion company must create vastly more absolute value to generate the same multiple expansion.
The trade-off is liquidity and business risk.
Mid-cap and smaller-cap equities generally trade less volume than mega-caps. A hedge fund with a meaningful ownership stake cannot always exit rapidly without moving the market.
Smaller companies may also have less diversified revenue, weaker bargaining power and less access to capital in recessions.
Sunriver attempts to address this through fundamental research and a long time horizon rather than simply avoiding volatility.
The manager's statement that it "plays offense when others are playing defense" is also strategically significant. It implies that Sunriver views market dislocations as opportunities to deploy capital rather than automatically shrinking exposure.
That approach can be highly profitable after indiscriminate selloffs if the manager correctly distinguishes temporary price dislocation from permanent impairment.
It can also amplify losses if the manager deploys aggressively too early during a genuine deterioration in fundamentals.
2026 13F: ARAMARK, WASTE CONNECTIONS, SS&C, DOLLAR GENERAL AND A FOCUSED LONG BOOK
Sunriver's June 30, 2026 Form 13F provides one of the strongest external windows into its actual investment process. The reported U.S. long-equity book totaled approximately $636.84 million and contained only 21 positions.
The largest disclosed position was Aramark, worth approximately $60.1 million and representing about 9.4% of the reported long book. Sunriver owned roughly 1.06 million shares after reducing the position during the quarter.
Waste Connections was second at approximately $57.3 million, representing roughly 9.0%.
SS&C Technologies represented approximately $50.5 million, or about 7.9%.
Dollar General was a major new position at approximately $38.3 million, around 6.0% of the disclosed portfolio.
First Advantage represented approximately $35.0 million.
Booking Holdings was approximately $34.7 million.
Lennox International represented approximately $33.8 million.
Live Nation was approximately $32.0 million.
Core & Main represented approximately $29.9 million.
The top positions demonstrate several characteristics consistent with Sunriver's stated philosophy. These are established operating companies rather than early-stage speculative biotechnology or pre-revenue technology businesses. Many have durable business models but can periodically experience valuation dislocations because of operating uncertainty, cyclical concerns or company-specific events.
The long book is also clearly concentrated. The top three positions represented more than a quarter of reported 13F value, while the top ten represented approximately 63%.
Concentration increases the importance of stock-specific research. If a 9% position declines 30%, the direct impact on the disclosed long portfolio is materially larger than in a diversified 100-stock fund.
At the same time, 13F data alone cannot determine net concentration because Sunriver's short positions and other hedges are not disclosed.
ARAMARK: A LONG-DURATION CONVICTION POSITION
Aramark is especially useful as a case study because Sunriver has owned the stock for years rather than merely appearing for one quarter.
Historical 13F databases show an Aramark position dating back to at least 2017.
Aramark provides food, facilities and uniform-related services across institutional customers such as universities, stadiums, healthcare facilities and businesses.
The company has gone through multiple strategic and operational changes during Sunriver's holding period, including management changes and the separation of Vestis.
A long holding period fits Sunriver's claim that it is willing to remain invested through multi-year business transformations rather than continuously rotate into short-term earnings trades.
It also creates thesis-drift risk. Investors should periodically ask whether a long-held stock remains attractive at current valuation or whether familiarity makes the manager less willing to reconsider the original thesis.
The Q2 2026 reduction in Sunriver's Aramark shares shows that the manager does adjust position size even in long-held investments rather than treating them as permanent holdings.
INTEGRAL AD SCIENCE: FROM LARGE OWNERSHIP TO EXIT
Integral Ad Science provides another revealing case study.
Sunriver built a large position in the digital advertising measurement company and appeared in Schedule 13G ownership filings together with Will Cook.
An August 2025 filing associated with the company showed Sunriver with shared voting and dispositive power over approximately 8.82 million shares.
By November 2025, a later Schedule 13G reported approximately 7.12 million shares and about 4.3% ownership, meaning the stake had moved below the 5% reporting threshold.
Sunriver's regulatory ownership filing explicitly stated that the securities were held by advisory clients of Sunriver Management and that Cook could be considered a control person of the manager.
This is particularly useful diligence evidence because it independently connects Cook, Sunriver Management and large real portfolio positions.
The IAS position also demonstrates why 13F portfolio values can move dramatically even without fund-level losses.
At the end of 2025, Sunriver's disclosed 13F book was approximately $953.9 million.
By March 31, 2026, it had fallen to approximately $591.3 million.
That roughly $363 million reduction should not automatically be described as a 38% investment loss. Position exits, corporate transactions, tender activity, distributions, short exposure, new securities classifications and changes in reported holdings can materially affect the 13F total.
By June 30, 2026, the reported long book recovered to approximately $636.8 million.
This volatility in public 13F value is precisely why FilingDossier should avoid using quarterly 13F totals as a substitute for audited fund NAV.
FIRST ADVANTAGE: ACTIVE SIZING RATHER THAN STATIC "BUY AND HOLD"
First Advantage provides a different picture.
Historical 13F data shows Sunriver's position increasing and decreasing repeatedly over multiple quarters.
For example, the manager held roughly 2.27 million shares in early 2024, later increased above 3.4 million shares during 2025, and held approximately 1.94 million shares at June 30, 2026 after materially reducing the position from the previous quarter.
This shows that "long-term" at Sunriver does not necessarily mean static position sizing.
A manager can hold a core thesis for years while trading around valuation, risk and portfolio opportunities.
That approach can improve returns if sizing decisions are correct.
It can also create execution risk and taxable turnover depending on the vehicle and investor.
For institutional diligence, it is useful to distinguish holding-period philosophy from turnover statistics. A manager can own the same company for several years but still trade significant portions of the position every quarter.
LONG/SHORT RISK AND WHY 13F IS ONLY HALF THE STORY
Public sources describe Sunriver as a fundamental long/short equity manager.
That means the visible 13F is structurally incomplete.
13F filings disclose many U.S.-listed long securities but generally do not disclose ordinary short-stock positions.
They also omit most swaps, derivatives, foreign ordinary shares, cash and other exposures.
A long book worth $636.8 million therefore does not mean Sunriver is $636.8 million net long.
The manager could theoretically hold hundreds of millions of dollars of short exposure against that book.
Investors need gross exposure and net exposure from the manager.
Gross exposure measures the total amount of long plus short exposure.
Net exposure reflects longs minus shorts.
Two funds with identical 13F portfolios can have radically different risk if one has no shorts and another is heavily hedged.
Short selling introduces additional risks.
A short position has asymmetric loss potential because a stock price can theoretically rise without limit.
Borrow costs can increase.
Lenders can recall shares.
Corporate events can cause sudden price spikes.
Crowded shorts can experience squeezes.
A manager focused on mid-cap equities may encounter even greater short-borrow constraints than one trading highly liquid mega-caps.
Investors should therefore request historical gross/net exposure, largest short losses, borrow-cost limits and concentration limits.
SUNRIVER LONG FUND: A USEFUL WINDOW INTO INVESTOR DEMAND FOR DIFFERENT EXPOSURE
The existence of Sunriver Long Fund LP and Ltd. is strategically meaningful.
Some hedge-fund investors want alpha from stock selection but do not want the complexity or return profile of short books.
Others may already manage market hedges at the portfolio level and prefer a long-biased allocation.
A separate long vehicle allows Sunriver potentially to serve these investors without changing the flagship mandate.
The domestic Long Fund began in 2022 and public offering records show cumulative securities sales of approximately $52.1 million.
The Cayman Long Fund began in 2020 and has approximately $157 million of cumulative offering sales.
Both share Sunriver Management and the same Greenwich phone and operating identity.
Randolph Willett Cook is directly identified as a director in the Cayman Long Fund's Form D.
The existence of parallel Long vehicles also reinforces the manager's institutional architecture: this is not one legal fund sitting behind one website, but a small family of domestic/offshore pools tailored to different investor and strategy requirements.
FORM ADV, $1.2 BILLION RAUM AND CURRENT ORGANIZATIONAL SCALE
Sunriver Management's March 30, 2026 Form ADV reports approximately $1.2 billion of regulatory AUM across seven accounts.
All or nearly all assets are reported as discretionary in public adviser datasets, which is consistent with a hedge-fund manager rather than a consulting business where clients approve individual trades.
The adviser is registered with the SEC under:
CRD: 281277 SEC File: 801-106651 13F CIK: 0001663900
The firm's public data also identifies performance-based compensation, which is typical for private hedge-fund vehicles.
The latest Form ADV-derived summaries reviewed do not report Item 11 disciplinary disclosures.
That should be stated carefully. An empty disciplinary section does not prove that no investor complaint, confidential SEC examination comment, commercial lawsuit or employee dispute has ever occurred.
But it is meaningful that the current adviser disclosure does not identify a reportable criminal, civil or regulatory disciplinary event.
The manager's roughly $1.2 billion regulatory asset base also helps reconcile the broader platform.
The four main private vehicles have substantial cumulative fundraising, but RAUM additionally reflects current regulatory methodology rather than simply summing Form D proceeds.
INVESTMENT TEAM AND OPERATING INFRASTRUCTURE
Sunriver is much smaller organizationally than Point72, AQR or RA Capital.
That is not inherently a disadvantage.
A concentrated fundamental equity strategy can operate effectively with a small research team if responsibilities are clearly divided.
Public organizational information identifies:
Will Cook – Founder / Portfolio Manager John Stadnyk – Chief Operating Officer / Chief Financial Officer David Weinreb – Head Trader Andrew Brownstein – Sector Head Raymond Musalo – Sector Head Young Yu – Marketing / Partner Relations Additional investment and operations professionals
John Stadnyk's role is particularly well verified because he signs current Fund LP Form D amendments as CFO of the investment manager.
This creates an identifiable separation between portfolio management and financial/operational responsibilities.
The presence of a dedicated head trader also matters for a concentrated mid-cap strategy. Execution costs can become meaningful when the fund builds or exits multi-million-dollar positions in less-liquid equities.
Public materials reviewed for this article do not provide a complete current administrator, auditor, prime-broker, custodian and legal-counsel list for each Sunriver fund.
Institutional LPs should obtain these directly from the latest audited financial statements and PPM.
For a long/short fund, the prime broker is especially important because it holds collateral, finances long exposure and facilitates stock borrow for shorts.
WEBSITE PENETRATION: CORRECT DOMAIN, REAL ADDRESS — BUT A QUALITY-CONTROL ISSUE
Sunriver's official website is sunrivermgmt.com.
It matches the current Greenwich address:
2 Sound View Drive 2nd Floor Greenwich, CT 06830 203-900-3900
The website describes Sunriver as founded by Will Cook in 2014 and accurately reflects the manager's under-$25-billion-market-cap, long-term fundamental philosophy.
The investor-relations contact is publicly listed as [email protected].
These details align with SEC filings and materially support entity verification.
There is, however, a notable website-quality issue worth documenting rather than ignoring. At the time of this review, the official "About Us" page contained apparent unfinished template material such as "Meet Our Attorneys," placeholder executive names and Lorem Ipsum text.
That does not undermine the SEC filings, investment adviser registration or actual fund identity.
But it is poor website hygiene for an institutional asset manager and can confuse investors or search engines.
The discrepancy is particularly obvious because the homepage itself correctly describes Sunriver, while the secondary About page appears to include remnants of a generic website template.
For FilingDossier's independent review, this should be treated as a digital-governance / website-quality weakness—not as evidence of securities fraud.
The manager would improve public transparency by replacing the placeholder page with a real team page, investment-history overview and clear regulatory disclosures.
This point also matters for Google. Search engines can index placeholder content, weakening entity relevance and making the website appear less professionally maintained than the underlying investment organization actually is.
MARKET-TURMOIL STRATEGY AND THE RISK OF "PLAYING OFFENSE"
Sunriver says it has a history of actively deploying capital during market turmoil.
This is potentially powerful.
Sharp market selloffs often create forced sellers, indiscriminate de-risking and valuation gaps between price and long-term fundamentals.
A manager with stable capital can buy strong companies while leveraged or short-term investors are forced to sell.
But "playing offense" carries timing risk.
In a genuine recession or structural industry decline, the first selloff may not represent the bottom.
A stock down 30% can fall another 50%.
Aggressive deployment only produces superior returns if the manager's fundamental analysis correctly distinguishes temporary fear from lasting impairment.
The approach also depends heavily on the investor base.
If LPs redeem during market stress, the fund may be forced to sell precisely when the manager wants to buy.
Sunriver's preference for long-term aligned investors therefore has an economic purpose rather than being merely marketing language.
Investors should examine historical redemption behavior during 2020, 2022 and other volatile periods and whether the fund uses gates or notice periods to protect portfolio liquidity.
CONCENTRATION AND MID-CAP LIQUIDITY RISK
The Q2 2026 13F contained only 21 positions.
A 21-stock long book can still be diversified across sectors, but it is concentrated compared with broad equity funds.
The top ten represented roughly 63% of the visible portfolio.
Several individual positions were near 8%-10%.
Concentration magnifies research edge when the manager is correct.
It also magnifies mistakes.
A 40% decline in a 10% gross position can reduce the long book by roughly four percentage points before hedging effects.
Liquidity is related.
A $50 million position in a mid-cap company cannot always be liquidated in one trading session without substantial market impact.
If Sunriver owns more than 5% of an issuer, Schedule 13D/13G reporting can also make the position more visible to other market participants.
Integral Ad Science illustrates this. Sunriver's ownership became large enough to trigger beneficial-ownership reporting.
Transparency can be useful to outsiders but can make trading intentions easier to infer.
Investors should request liquidity buckets based on average daily trading volume rather than assuming a listed stock is automatically liquid.
STYLE RISK: QUALITY COMPOUNDERS, RECOVERIES AND VALUATION DISLOCATIONS
The latest holdings suggest Sunriver is willing to own both durable compounders and companies experiencing temporary uncertainty.
Waste Connections and SS&C have recurring or relatively resilient business economics.
Dollar General can represent a recovery or valuation-dislocation thesis after periods of operating pressure.
Aramark combines recurring institutional relationships with execution and margin-improvement opportunities.
Live Nation introduces consumer/event and regulatory sensitivity.
Booking Holdings brings travel and internet exposure.
This diversity demonstrates bottom-up stock selection rather than one narrow sector theme.
But many positions can still share a factor characteristic: they may require the market to recognize improving fundamentals over a multi-year period.
If investors prefer high-momentum mega-cap growth, Sunriver's less-trafficked mid-cap focus can underperform even when underlying companies remain healthy.
Style cycles can therefore generate meaningful tracking error versus the S&P 500.
Sunriver's own stated philosophy suggests it accepts that possibility.
INVESTOR CONCENTRATION
Sunriver Fund LP reports only 36 investors despite $327.6 million of cumulative securities sold.
A simple division produces roughly $9.1 million of cumulative reported capital per investor, although actual allocations are certainly uneven and the calculation does not represent current account balances.
This is consistent with an institutional or high-net-worth investor base.
It also creates LP concentration risk.
If several large investors represent a significant portion of NAV, one redemption can force meaningful portfolio changes.
The Cayman flagship has historically reported an even smaller number of investors relative to cumulative offering size.
Prospective LPs should therefore request the largest-investor percentage, top-five investor concentration and notice period for redemptions.
A fund can hold liquid listed equities yet still face operational difficulty if a single investor requests hundreds of millions of dollars back in a short period.
FORM 13F VALUE DROP: WHY IT SHOULD NOT BE MISREPORTED AS A FUND LOSS
Sunriver's visible U.S. long book fell from approximately $953.9 million at December 31, 2025 to approximately $591.3 million at March 31, 2026.
That is a very large change.
But FilingDossier should not publish a headline stating that Sunriver "lost $362 million" based solely on those figures.
13F measures the reported market value of certain long securities at two dates.
The change can result from:
Stocks sold Positions tendered or acquired Capital moved into non-13F assets Cash increases Different securities Portfolio hedging changes Investor flows Market performance
It does not show shorts.
It does not show cash.
It does not show complete derivatives.
It is not fund NAV.
By Q2 2026 the reported long-equity book had increased again to approximately $636.8 million.
The correct diligence question is why the portfolio composition changed materially, not to infer audited performance from public long holdings.
REGULATORY AND NEGATIVE-EVIDENCE REVIEW
Sunriver Management is an SEC-registered adviser with a current Form ADV and long-running Form 13F filing history.
The reviewed current adviser data shows no reportable disciplinary disclosure in the latest Form ADV summary.
Current SEC beneficial-ownership filings directly connect Sunriver and Will Cook to actual positions such as Integral Ad Science.
The reviewed primary public sources did not identify a major SEC fraud enforcement action against Sunriver Management or Will Cook.
Again, this is not proof that the manager has never experienced an examination comment, private dispute or portfolio-company-related issue.
The most visible negative point found during brand penetration is the manager's unfinished-looking official About page containing generic legal-firm template language and Lorem Ipsum.
That is a communications-quality problem rather than a regulatory finding.
More substantive investment risks are concentration, founder dependence, long/short leverage, mid-cap liquidity, style drawdowns and investor concentration.
Sunriver's own marketing language also makes clear that minimizing short-term volatility is not the objective, so investors should not interpret "protect capital in down markets" as a promise that losses will be small in every market decline.
FINAL ASSESSMENT
Sunriver Fund LP is a long-running and highly traceable hedge-fund vehicle managed by an SEC-registered Greenwich investment adviser. The April 17, 2026 Form D reports $327,607,124 sold to 36 investors, a first sale dating to November 1, 2015, Rule 506(b), Section 3(c)(7) and no disclosed placement commissions. Sunriver Management LLC and Sunriver GP LLC are directly named in the regulatory structure.
The broader platform is substantially larger. Sunriver Management's March 2026 Form ADV reports approximately $1.2 billion of regulatory assets under management across seven accounts. Confirmed affiliated private funds include the domestic and Cayman flagship Sunriver funds and domestic/offshore Sunriver Long Funds.
The manager's strategy is highly differentiated from quantitative or mega-cap-focused hedge funds. Will Cook built the investment process after earlier roles at Ziff Brothers, General Atlantic, Morgan Stanley and related investment organizations. Sunriver concentrates on fundamental equity ideas, generally below $25 billion in market capitalization, and explicitly emphasizes long holding periods and buying during market dislocations.
The public portfolio supports that description. Sunriver's June 2026 13F contained only 21 disclosed positions worth approximately $636.8 million. Aramark, Waste Connections and SS&C Technologies were the three largest long holdings, followed by positions including Dollar General, First Advantage, Booking Holdings, Lennox, Live Nation and Core & Main. Beneficial-ownership filings around Integral Ad Science independently demonstrate that Sunriver has at times built large individual-company stakes.
The principal unresolved issues concern complete portfolio risk rather than entity identity. Public 13F cannot reveal shorts, net exposure, leverage or derivatives. Form D cannot reveal audited performance, current NAV, redemption activity or fees. The manager's small team and Cook-centered process create meaningful key-person dependence. The limited investor count increases potential LP concentration. The under-$25-billion market-cap universe creates opportunity but also liquidity risk.
The website also deserves improvement: the official domain and contact details match regulatory records, but an About page currently contains apparent template and Lorem Ipsum material. That is not evidence that the fund is illegitimate, but it is inconsistent with the quality expected from a billion-dollar institutional manager and is worth fixing for both investor confidence and Google entity quality.
For a prospective LP, the most important next documents are the latest audited financial statements, complete net return series, long/short gross and net exposure history, leverage limits, largest drawdowns, short-book performance, current top positions, investor concentration, redemption terms, administrator, auditor, prime brokers, fee structure and allocation policy between the flagship and Long Fund vehicles.
SEC SNAPSHOT
Issuer: Sunriver Fund LP CIK: 0001658867 SEC File Number: 021-251599 Entity Type: Limited Partnership Jurisdiction: Delaware Principal Address: c/o Sunriver Management LLC, 2 Sound View Drive, 2nd Floor, Greenwich, CT 06830 Phone: 203-900-3900 First Sale: November 1, 2015 Latest Form D: Form D/A Latest Form D Date: April 17, 2026 Fund Classification: Pooled Investment Fund / Hedge Fund Offering Exemption: Regulation D Rule 506(b) Investment Company Act Exclusion: Section 3(c)(7) Offering Size: Indefinite Total Amount Sold: $327,607,124 Investors: 36 Regulatory Minimum Investment: $0 Sales Commissions: $0 Finder's Fees: $0 Investment Manager: Sunriver Management LLC General Partner Entity: Sunriver GP LLC Latest Form D Signatory: John Stadnyk Signatory Role: Chief Financial Officer of Investment Manager Founder / Portfolio Manager: Randolph Willett "Will" Cook Manager Founded: 2014 Investment Adviser CRD: 281277 SEC Adviser File: 801-106651 Manager 13F CIK: 0001663900 13F File Number: 028-17348 Latest Form ADV Filing: March 30, 2026 Latest Regulatory AUM: Approximately $1.2 billion Latest Reported Client Accounts: 7 Adviser Discretionary Assets: Substantially all reported RAUM Public Employee Count: Approximately 9 Current ADV Disciplinary Disclosure: None identified in reviewed latest public summary Official Website: sunrivermgmt.com Investor Relations Email: [email protected] Primary Strategy: Fundamental Long / Short Equity Public Investment Universe: Primarily equities below approximately $25 billion market capitalization Investment Philosophy: Less-trafficked companies; long-term fundamental investing; active deployment during market dislocations Founder Prior Experience: Ziff Brothers Investments; General Atlantic; Morgan Stanley; Internet Capital Group / Actua Founder Education: University of Virginia; Columbia Business School Related Offshore Flagship: Sunriver Fund Ltd. Sunriver Fund Ltd CIK: 0001672350 Offshore Jurisdiction: Cayman Islands Offshore Flagship Latest Public Cumulative Offering Amount: Approximately $274 million Related Domestic Strategy: Sunriver Long Fund LP Sunriver Long Fund LP CIK: 0001903856 Sunriver Long Fund LP Latest Public Cumulative Offering Amount: Approximately $52.1 million Related Offshore Strategy: Sunriver Long Fund Ltd. Sunriver Long Fund Ltd CIK: 0001805213 Sunriver Long Fund Ltd Latest Public Cumulative Offering Amount: Approximately $157 million Confirmed Private Funds in Latest Form ADV-Linked Data: 4 Latest 13F Quarter: June 30, 2026 Latest 13F Filed: August 13, 2026 Latest 13F Long-Equity Value: Approximately $636.84 million Latest Reported Long Positions: 21 Largest Q2 2026 Long Holding: Aramark Aramark Value: Approximately $60.1 million Aramark 13F Weight: Approximately 9.4% Second Largest: Waste Connections Waste Connections Value: Approximately $57.3 million Third Largest: SS&C Technologies SS&C Value: Approximately $50.5 million Major New Q2 2026 Position: Dollar General Other Major Q2 Holdings: First Advantage; Booking Holdings; Lennox International; Live Nation; Core & Main Top-10 13F Concentration: Approximately 63% Historical Significant Ownership Example: Integral Ad Science IAS Public Ownership Evidence: Schedule 13G filings directly identify Sunriver Management and Randolph Willett Cook Current 13F Does Not Reveal: Short positions; most derivatives; cash; complete foreign exposure; total fund NAV Current Audited Fund Performance: Not publicly disclosed through Form D Current Gross / Net Exposure: Not publicly disclosed Current Leverage: Not publicly disclosed Current Management / Performance Fees: Requires current fund documents Current Administrator: Requires verification from current fund documents Current Auditor: Requires verification from current audited financial statements Current Prime Broker(s): Requires verification Website Penetration Finding: Official homepage information aligns with SEC identity, but the current About page contains apparent template / Lorem Ipsum content and should be corrected Major Public SEC Enforcement Identified in Reviewed Sources: No defining manager-level SEC fraud enforcement action identified; this does not prove absence of examinations or private disputes Primary Risks: Concentrated equities, mid-cap liquidity, long/short leverage, short squeezes and borrow costs, stock-selection error, market-dislocation timing risk, investor concentration, portfolio allocation conflicts between flagship and Long Funds, key-person dependence and incomplete public visibility into net exposure Entity Confusion Warning: Do not confuse Sunriver Management LLC with Sunriver Venture Partners or other unrelated entities using the Sunriver name. The correct manager is CRD 281277, SEC 801-106651, headquartered at 2 Sound View Drive in Greenwich and founded by Will Cook. Duplicate Brand Rule: Sunriver Fund LP, Sunriver Fund Ltd., Sunriver Long Fund LP, Sunriver Long Fund Ltd., Sunriver GP LLC and Sunriver Management LLC belong to the same Sunriver Management brand and should not be generated again as separate FilingDossier brands unless a specific vehicle is explicitly requested. Independent Conclusion: Sunriver Fund LP has a strong and independently verifiable institutional identity supported by a decade of Form D history, SEC adviser registration, Form ADV, Form 13F, beneficial-ownership filings, a matching official website and a clearly identified founder and operating team. The manager's roughly $1.2 billion regulatory asset base and real public-market ownership record support its institutional scale. The central diligence questions concern audited performance, short exposure, leverage, concentration, liquidity, investor concentration and key-person dependence rather than whether Sunriver is a genuine operating hedge-fund manager.
Independent research summary based on SEC Form D, Form ADV, Form 13F, Schedule 13G, Sunriver Management first-party materials and public professional biographies. Form D, SEC adviser registration and public ownership filings are regulatory disclosures and do not constitute SEC approval, verification of investment performance or a guarantee of investor returns.