Independent Verdict
Future Labs Capital Fund II, L.P. is a Delaware venture capital fund formed in 2024 and operated from 280 Missouri Avenue in Jeffersonville, Indiana. Its September 17, 2026 Form D reports a $65 million Rule 506(b) offering, $6.5 million sold, $58.5 million remaining and 25 investors, with the first sale dating to March 4, 2025. The filing classifies the vehicle specifically as a Venture Capital Fund and relies on Section 3(c)(1). Future Labs Capital II, LLC is the general partner; Future Labs, LLC is a managing member of that GP; Hugh "Mack" Shwab is identified as manager and member of Future Labs, LLC; and Michael W. Kosloske appears through Gucci Holdings, LLC, another managing member of the GP. One of the most useful disclosures is Item 16 of the Form D: the fund reports $104,300 of offering proceeds paid as management fees to the GP for the period from January 10, 2025, when operations commenced, through December 31, 2025. The manager's public strategy is unusually specific. Future Labs Capital focuses on early-stage artificial intelligence and quantum-computing companies and maintains a formal relationship with MIT's Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory, or CSAIL. MIT itself published a detailed April 2026 case study describing Future Labs Capital as a CSAIL Alliances affiliate, confirming that the firm has used that relationship to source early-stage companies from MIT research and that it became the first investor in Atlantic Quantum before the company was later acquired by Google Quantum AI. This combination of SEC filings, MIT institutional evidence, an identifiable first fund and real portfolio transactions makes the manager substantially more verifiable than a newly formed venture fund with only a Form D. The main diligence issues are Fund II's still-early fundraising stage, the degree to which Fund I's reported results can be independently verified, concentrated exposure to technically difficult AI and quantum startups, valuation risk and whether a relatively small investment organization can successfully scale from its first fund into a $65 million successor vehicle.
SEC, Management Structure, Fund I Continuity and MIT Relationship
Future Labs Capital Fund II, L.P. was formed in Delaware in 2024 under CIK 0002154534. The fund's principal office is 280 Missouri Ave., Suite A-1, Jeffersonville, Indiana 47130, telephone 502-354-2380. Its September 2026 filing is technically a new Form D notice even though the first sale occurred in March 2025, and it states that the offering is expected to continue for more than one year. The securities offered are equity and pooled investment fund interests. The fund reports no broker, placement agent, sales commissions or finder's fees, and the Form D minimum investment is $0; as always, that regulatory field should not be interpreted as meaning the fund has no practical subscription minimum because actual eligibility and commitment requirements can be imposed in the partnership and subscription documents. The $6.5 million sold to 25 investors implies a simple average of approximately $260,000 per investor if commitments were evenly distributed, although actual subscriptions can vary materially. The most unusual Form D disclosure is the $104,300 paid to the GP as management fees for the 2025 operating period. Relative to $6.5 million of securities reported sold by September 2026, that historical fee amount is not in itself evidence of an excessive expense ratio because the fund's capital base, timing of commitments and fee calculation method may differ, but it gives investors a rare public starting point for analyzing management-company economics.
The management chain is more complex than the fund name alone suggests. Future Labs Capital II, LLC is the general partner. Future Labs, LLC is a managing member of the GP, with Hugh Shwab identified as its manager and member. Gucci Holdings, LLC is also listed as a managing member of the GP, and Michael W. Kosloske appears as manager of Gucci Holdings. This differs somewhat from the first fund's structure. Future Labs Capital Fund I, L.P., formed in 2021, identified Future Labs Capital, LLC as general partner and Future Labs, LLC as the sole member of that GP, with Hugh Shwab, Robert Penta and John Huneke named as related persons. Fund I's April 2024 amendment reported a $65 million offering, $22.6 million sold to 19 investors and a $500,000 minimum investment. This means Fund II is not merely the manager's first experiment with a $65 million headline target; the predecessor vehicle used the same target size and had already raised more than $22 million by 2024.
The MIT connection is independently documented rather than existing only on the Future Labs website. MIT CSAIL Alliances says Future Labs Capital was founded by serial entrepreneur and investor Mack Shwab, focuses on early-stage AI and quantum computing, and in its first phase raised and deployed more than $25 million within 18 months while achieving two early exits. MIT says Shwab originally came to MIT in 2022 while working on API Foundry, a healthcare data-standardization business, and began developing the Future Labs thesis after attending MIT classes and meeting technical founders directly. Future Labs subsequently became a CSAIL Alliances affiliate and built a strategy around finding technologies emerging from MIT and CSAIL. A separate CSAIL event page says the formal strategic relationship dates to 2021, that Future Labs reviews roughly 2,500 opportunities per year through its broader sourcing network, and that the manager had two funds under management by 2025. These sources use somewhat different descriptions of the firm's founding chronology and platform scale, so it is better to present the relationship itself as verified while treating specific AUM and performance claims according to their date and source.
Strategy, Portfolio Penetration, Exits and Deep-Tech Evidence
Future Labs Capital's strategy is narrower and more technically oriented than a generic early-stage technology fund. Its own website says the firm focuses on quantum computing and artificial intelligence startup investment and uses its CSAIL relationship to connect outside ventures with MIT technologies. MIT's April 2026 case study provides the strongest independent evidence for how that strategy operates in practice. While attending Professor Will Oliver's quantum-computing course, Shwab was introduced to the founders of Atlantic Quantum. Future Labs became the company's first investor. Atlantic Quantum, a superconducting quantum-computing startup spun out of MIT's Engineering Quantum Systems group, was later acquired by Google and its team joined Google Quantum AI. That transaction is particularly important because it demonstrates a complete sourcing-to-exit example tied directly to the manager's claimed MIT access rather than merely listing a startup logo on a portfolio page.
MIT also identifies Inkbit and Foundation EGI as Future Labs investments emerging from Professor Wojciech Matusik's CSAIL research groups. Inkbit is particularly easy to verify independently: in May 2024 the additive-manufacturing company announced a $19 million financing round led by Ingersoll Rand with participation from Future Labs Capital alongside GC Ventures America, iGlobe Partners, Ocado, Phoenix Venture Partners, Stratasys, Zeon Ventures and other investors. Inkbit develops advanced additive manufacturing capable of producing complex multi-functional parts and represents the kind of hard-tech investment that sits between AI/software and traditional industrial venture capital. MIT's 2026 case study further states that Future Labs invested in Advanced Silicon Group after a CSAIL startup event and helped lead a financing exceeding $1 million. These examples show that the investment thesis is not restricted to pure software: it includes quantum hardware, advanced manufacturing, silicon and other technically complex businesses emerging from research environments.
Earlier MIT CSAIL materials identify Fund I portfolio companies including Atlantic Quantum, DeepKinetix, Array Insight, AssayQuant, Untitled, Trilio and XRHealth. The same 2025 CSAIL event page says Future Labs reported approximately $50 million of total company investments and $200 million of "assets under management and supervision," and claimed that the first portfolio had produced approximately 10x returns. By contrast, a Carta customer case study describes Future Labs Capital as having about $50 million of AUM. These figures should not be treated as contradictory without context because they may reflect different dates, definitions and scopes—AUM, AUM plus supervised capital, and aggregate company investment are not interchangeable. For FilingDossier purposes, the safer conclusion is that independent service-provider and MIT materials confirm a meaningful first-fund operating history, while exact current regulatory AUM and historical fund-level returns should be verified from audited financial statements rather than inferred from marketing materials.
The Atlantic Quantum exit is especially relevant to Fund II's quantum thesis. Early-stage quantum investing has unusually long development cycles, but acquisition by a strategic technology company can provide an exit before a startup becomes a fully mature independent commercial business. At the same time, this creates a portfolio-construction challenge: quantum companies often require repeated capital injections for cryogenics, fabrication, control electronics, specialized personnel and experimental infrastructure. The time from research breakthrough to reliable commercial product can be much longer than in conventional SaaS. Future Labs therefore needs enough reserves to support winners through multiple financing rounds while avoiding overcapitalizing technically unsuccessful companies. Fund II's $65 million target would give the manager more ability to follow companies through later rounds than a smaller seed fund, but it also raises the question of whether the manager can continue obtaining attractive early entry valuations as check sizes increase.
AI exposure introduces a different set of risks. AI startups can scale more quickly than quantum hardware but face extremely rapid competition, falling model costs, dependency on third-party foundation models and expensive compute requirements. Many AI companies that appear differentiated at seed stage may be commoditized as larger model providers release new capabilities. Future Labs' strongest potential advantage is therefore not simply "investing in AI," but sourcing technically differentiated research before it becomes widely commercialized. The MIT relationship can improve deal flow, but it does not eliminate underwriting risk, and not every MIT-linked technology will produce a venture-scale company.
The fund should also be evaluated for portfolio-stage consistency. Future Labs describes itself as an early-stage investor, yet successful companies may quickly require much larger Series B, C and growth financings. Investors should ask how much of Fund II is reserved for initial seed investments versus follow-ons, whether the manager uses SPVs for later rounds, what ownership percentage it targets at entry, what percentage of ownership it seeks to preserve, and whether Fund II can invest in companies already owned by Fund I. Cross-fund follow-ons are common in venture capital but create allocation and valuation questions if a newer fund purchases securities in a company where an older related fund already owns a stake.
What We Think, Key Risks, Due Diligence and Final Assessment
Future Labs Capital Fund II has a strong identity and strategy-verification trail for a small emerging venture manager. The SEC confirms the $65 million Fund II, $6.5 million sold, 25 investors, Future Labs Capital II LLC as GP and the Shwab/Kosloske ownership chain. The SEC also discloses an actual historical GP management-fee payment of $104,300, which is more transparent than most Form D filings. Fund I establishes regulatory continuity through a prior $65 million offering with $22.6 million reported sold by April 2024, while MIT CSAIL independently verifies the manager's relationship with the lab, its sourcing model and several concrete portfolio investments. The strongest realized example is Atlantic Quantum: Future Labs was described by MIT as the startup's first investor before the company was acquired by Google, while Inkbit provides additional independent evidence through a $19 million financing backed by major strategic investors.
The main weakness is that Fund II remains early relative to its target. Only $6.5 million, or 10% of the $65 million offering, had been reported sold as of September 17, 2026. Fund II has technically been operating since early 2025, so investors should ask why reported fundraising remains at that level, whether commitments exist that have not yet closed, whether the fund expects a long rolling close, and what minimum scale is necessary for its intended portfolio construction. A smaller final fund could still work for seed-stage investing, but it could reduce diversification and follow-on reserves if the investment strategy was designed around a full $65 million close.
Performance claims also require disciplined treatment. CSAIL materials repeat manager-reported figures such as approximately 10x returns and two early exits, but public sources do not provide audited Fund I IRR, MOIC, DPI, RVPI or a complete realization schedule. Atlantic Quantum's Google acquisition is real evidence of an exit, but the public sources reviewed here do not disclose the acquisition price, Future Labs' ownership percentage or the actual proceeds returned to Fund I. Investors should therefore request the Fund I audited statements and investment-level attribution before using headline return claims in underwriting Fund II.
Operational capacity is another important issue. Future Labs is a relatively small organization pursuing unusually technical sectors. Deep-tech investing requires scientific diligence, intellectual-property review, founder evaluation and the ability to distinguish research novelty from commercial viability. The MIT network is a meaningful sourcing and technical-information advantage, but the fund still needs independent investment judgment rather than relying on academic affiliation as a quality signal. Investors should examine who sits on the investment committee, which outside technical advisers are used, how conflicts are handled when multiple MIT-linked opportunities compete for capital, and how much decision-making authority is concentrated in Hugh Shwab and Michael Kosloske.
Fund expenses and related-party economics deserve particular attention because the public filing has already disclosed a management-fee payment. Investors should request the annual management-fee rate, whether it is calculated on commitments or invested capital, organizational expenses, carried interest, preferred return if any, recycling provisions, GP commitment, SPV expenses and whether portfolio-company consulting or advisory fees are paid to the manager or affiliates. They should also confirm the role of Carta: Carta publicly identifies Future Labs as a customer using fund administration and fund forecasting, which is useful operational evidence, but investors should determine whether Carta is the formal administrator of Fund II and whether financial statements receive an independent annual audit.
Overall, Future Labs Capital Fund II appears to be a genuine emerging deep-tech venture fund with a differentiated MIT-centered sourcing strategy and a verifiable predecessor-fund history. Its strongest evidence is not simply the Future Labs website but third-party confirmation from MIT CSAIL, actual financing announcements and the Atlantic Quantum acquisition. The biggest remaining questions are whether Fund II reaches sufficient scale, how much of Fund I's promoted performance is realized and independently verified, how Fund I and Fund II allocate overlapping opportunities, and whether the manager's operational infrastructure can scale alongside increasingly capital-intensive quantum and AI investments.
Form D confirms an exempt securities offering. MIT CSAIL affiliation confirms an institutional relationship and sourcing network. Neither constitutes SEC, MIT or CSAIL approval of Fund II's investment merits, valuations or expected returns.
Venture Capital Fund
Exemption: Rule 506(b)
Security Types: Equity Pooled Investment Fund Interests
Offering Duration: More than one year
Amount Remaining: $58,500,000
Percentage Sold: 10.0%
Simple Average Sold per Investor: Approximately $260,000 Important: actual subscriptions may differ substantially
Form D Minimum: $0
Sales Commissions: $0
Finder's Fees: $0
Management Fee Disclosed in Form D: $104,300
Management Fee Period: January 10, 2025 through December 31, 2025
Form D Explanation: Management fee paid to GP sponsoring and managing the partnership
Managing Member of GP: Future Labs, LLC
Additional GP Managing Member: Gucci Holdings, LLC
Key Related Persons: Hugh Shwab Michael W. Kosloske
Hugh Shwab Role: Manager and Member of Future Labs, LLC Manager of Managing Member of GP Founder / Managing Partner publicly associated with Future Labs Capital
Michael W. Kosloske Role: Manager of Gucci Holdings, LLC Managing Partner publicly associated with Future Labs Capital
Official Website: futurelabscapital.com
Public Strategy: Early-stage artificial intelligence Quantum computing Deep technology MIT-linked scientific and technical startups
MIT Relationship: Future Labs Capital is a CSAIL Alliances Affiliate Strategic relationship publicly documented by MIT CSAIL
MIT Relationship Timeline: Public CSAIL materials describe strategic partnership beginning in 2021
Manager-Reported Opportunity Review: Approximately 2,500 potential opportunities per year Source: MIT CSAIL event materials
Predecessor Fund:
Fund Name: Future Labs Capital Fund I, L.P.
CIK: 0001884345
Formation: Delaware, 2021
First Sale: May 17, 2021
2024 Offering: $65,000,000
2024 Amount Sold: $22,600,000
2024 Investors: 19
2024 Minimum Investment: $500,000
Fund I Related Persons: Future Labs Capital, LLC Future Labs, LLC Hugh Shwab Robert Penta John Huneke
Public Manager History: Future Labs describes first institutional venture activity around 2021-2022
MIT 2026 Case Study: More than $25M raised and deployed in first growth phase Two early exits reported
Important: Exact audited Fund I return metrics were not identified in reviewed public sources.
Verified / Publicly Supported Portfolio Evidence:
Atlantic Quantum Sector: Quantum computing
Future Labs Role: MIT states Future Labs became its first investor
Origin: MIT Engineering Quantum Systems Group
Exit: Atlantic Quantum team/company joined Google Quantum AI
Importance: Strong evidence of MIT-sourced venture investment progressing to a strategic exit
Inkbit Sector: Advanced additive manufacturing / deep tech
2024 Financing: $19M round
Lead Investor: Ingersoll Rand
Other Participants: Future Labs Capital GC Ventures America iGlobe Partners Ocado Phoenix Venture Partners Stratasys Zeon Ventures Others
Foundation EGI Origin: MIT CSAIL / Wojciech Matusik research ecosystem
Future Labs Relationship: Identified by MIT as an investment
Advanced Silicon Group Sector: Silicon / deep technology
Future Labs Relationship: MIT states Future Labs invested and helped lead a financing after a CSAIL event
Other Fund I Companies Identified in MIT Materials: DeepKinetix Array Insight AssayQuant Untitled Trilio XRHealth
Additional MIT-Linked Company Mention: Foundation EGI
Manager-Reported Historical Return: Approximately 10x referenced in 2025 MIT CSAIL event materials
Important: Treat as manager-reported / institutional-event material, not audited Fund II or Fund I performance until verified from financial statements.
External Platform Scale Claims:
MIT CSAIL 2025 Event Material: Approximately $50M total company investments Approximately $200M assets under management and supervision
Carta Customer Case Study: Approximately $50M AUM
Important: These figures use different dates and terminology and should not be presented as equivalent regulatory AUM.
Fund Administration / Operations Signal: Carta publicly identifies Future Labs Capital as a client using fund administration and fund forecasting products.
Exact Fund II Administrator: Should be confirmed directly
Auditor: Not identified in reviewed public sources
Custodian: Not identified
Fund Counsel: Not identified
Current Fund II Portfolio: Not publicly separated clearly enough from Fund I / platform-wide portfolio
Current Fund II NAV: Not publicly disclosed
Current Fund II IRR: Not publicly disclosed
Current Fund II MOIC: Not publicly disclosed
Current Fund II DPI: Not publicly disclosed
Management Fee Rate: Not publicly disclosed
Carried Interest: Not publicly disclosed
GP Commitment: Not publicly disclosed
Target Ownership: Not publicly disclosed
Follow-On Reserve Policy: Not publicly disclosed
Primary Strengths: Verified MIT CSAIL relationship Specific AI and quantum strategy Prior fund continuity Real portfolio evidence Atlantic Quantum strategic exit Institutional portfolio co-investors Deep-tech sourcing access Public management-fee disclosure Fund administration infrastructure signal
Primary Risks: Early fundraising stage Quantum technology execution risk AI commoditization Long deep-tech development cycles Capital-intensive portfolio companies Follow-on financing requirements Private valuation uncertainty Key-person dependence Small-team operating scale Portfolio concentration Academic-to-commercial transition risk Cross-fund allocation Illiquidity Exit-market risk Unverified historical performance metrics
Primary Due-Diligence Focus: Exact Fund II portfolio Amount called vs. committed Current investor commitments Expected final close Minimum viable fund size Initial check size Follow-on reserve percentage Fund I vs. Fund II allocation policy Current ownership stakes Entry valuations Portfolio-company runway Technical diligence process Investment committee Independent scientific advisers Audited Fund I IRR Fund I MOIC Fund I DPI Atlantic Quantum realized proceeds Second reported exit details Management fee rate Carry GP commitment Organizational expenses SPV fees Administrator Auditor Valuation policy Key-person provisions LPAC rights Side letters
Regulatory Penetration: Strong
MIT / Institutional Penetration: Exceptional
Portfolio Penetration: Strong at manager level
Exact Fund II Portfolio Transparency: Moderate to Limited
Exit Evidence: Strong for Atlantic Quantum
Website Transparency: Moderate; strategy clear but limited detailed fund-level data
Independent Conclusion: Future Labs Capital Fund II is a verified $65 million-target venture capital vehicle focused on AI, quantum computing and related deep technologies. It reported $6.5 million sold to 25 investors as of September 17, 2026, while the SEC filing also uniquely discloses $104,300 of historical management fees paid to the GP. Independent MIT CSAIL materials confirm the manager's institutional relationship, sourcing model, Atlantic Quantum investment and additional deep-tech portfolio activity. The principal remaining questions are Fund II fundraising scale, current portfolio composition, cross-fund allocation, operational capacity and independent verification of Fund I's promoted historical returns.