RESEARCH

Is Frontier Small Cap Value, L.P. Legit? Frontier Capital Management SEC Form D Review 2026

Is Frontier Small Cap Value, L.P. Legit? Frontier Capital Management SEC Form D Review 2026

The private fund's latest regulatory-derived data illustrates the difference between the individual partnership and the broader strategy. Current third-party Form ADV-derived records place Frontier Small Cap Value Fund LP gross assets around $115 million, while the strategy as a whole is approximately $2.5 billion. The remaining capital can therefore sit in separate accounts, collective trusts or other client structures rather than this LP alone.

The latest Form D reports $83.99 million cumulative offering sales and 71 investors. That number should not be treated as current NAV because subscriptions, withdrawals and portfolio appreciation occur independently of cumulative securities sales. The $115 million private-fund gross-asset estimate and $83.99 million Form D figure can therefore coexist without inconsistency.

CAPITAL APPRECIATION: ANOTHER LONG-RUNNING PRIVATE FUND AND A USEFUL CROSS-CHECK

Frontier Capital Appreciation Fund, L.P. provides an important second view of the same platform. The Delaware partnership carries CIK 0001378092 and dates its first sale to December 1, 2005. Its latest September 2026 Form D reports $239,324,052 sold to 51 investors, Rule 506(b), Section 3(c)(7), an indefinite offering and no commissions or finder's fees.

The Capital Appreciation strategy is based on a Growth-at-a-Reasonable-Price framework. Current registered-fund disclosures say Frontier looks for small- and mid-cap companies with above-average earnings-growth potential that remain available at reasonable valuations. Securities can be sold when price targets are achieved, fundamentals deteriorate or stronger opportunities appear.

Frontier has managed a predecessor Capital Appreciation mandate since January 5, 1996. Andrew B. Bennett and Peter G. Kuechle have been publicly identified as current day-to-day managers of a registered Capital Appreciation vehicle. Bennett joined Frontier in 2003 and moved into portfolio-management responsibility in 2010; Kuechle joined in 2002 after Dartmouth and Harvard Business School and later became a portfolio manager.

These long tenures are useful evidence of internal development. Frontier does not appear to repeatedly replace strategy leadership with external hires. Analysts can spend years learning the process before taking responsibility for portfolios.

The Capital Appreciation LP's much larger cumulative Form D amount also shows why one Frontier private vehicle cannot be used as a proxy for the whole company. Different strategies attract different LP populations and can have dramatically different capital histories even though the investment manager and centralized research platform are the same.

For FilingDossier, Small Cap Value, Capital Appreciation and Frontier's other pooled investment vehicles should therefore remain under one Frontier Capital Management brand rather than being treated as unrelated sponsors.

$10.73 BILLION 13F PORTFOLIO: FTAI AVIATION, GRANITE, ALASKA AIR, APPLIED OPTOELECTRONICS AND AKAMAI

Frontier's June 30, 2026 Form 13F is one of the strongest external validations of the manager's scale and investment style. SEC records identify Frontier Capital Management Company LLC as the institutional investment manager under CIK 0000351173, CRD 106274, SEC file 801-15724 and 13F file number 028-01185.

The aggregate reported long-equity value was approximately $10.73 billion, up from about $9.73 billion in the prior quarter. The largest disclosed holding was FTAI Aviation at approximately $320.2 million. Granite Construction was about $176.9 million, Alaska Air Group roughly $176.7 million, Applied Optoelectronics approximately $144.5 million and Akamai Technologies about $134.4 million.

These holdings are valuable because they demonstrate that Frontier's current portfolio is not concentrated in one thematic sector. FTAI Aviation and Alaska Air provide aviation exposure. Granite Construction is tied to infrastructure and construction. Applied Optoelectronics brings optical networking and AI/data-center infrastructure exposure. Akamai represents internet infrastructure and cybersecurity.

The profile fits bottom-up small/mid-cap research better than macro thematic investing. Companies can enter portfolios because of idiosyncratic earnings, competitive or valuation opportunities rather than because Frontier wants one top-down economic bet.

FTAI Aviation is particularly interesting because it became Frontier's largest overall reported holding in Q2 2026. FTAI operates aviation leasing and aftermarket businesses focused heavily on aircraft engines. The company can benefit from global aircraft shortages and demand for engine maintenance, but it also carries aviation-cycle, financing and asset-valuation risks.

Applied Optoelectronics has become a major beneficiary of data-center and optical-connectivity demand. Its rapid appreciation can materially alter portfolio weight even without additional buying. Frontier's willingness to own such a business illustrates that "small cap" does not mean low-growth or old-economy value.

Granite Construction and Alaska Air provide a different risk profile. Infrastructure spending, project execution, fuel prices, labor costs and consumer travel cycles matter more than technology valuations.

This cross-sector spread is one reason Frontier can operate six strategies from one centralized research organization.

AMG FRONTIER SMALL CAP GROWTH: PUBLIC FUND DATA EXPOSES THE PROCESS

The AMG Frontier Small Cap Growth Fund provides another useful window because registered mutual funds disclose more portfolio detail than private partnerships.

At April 30, 2026, the fund reported approximately $98.24 million in net assets and 124 holdings. Its largest positions included FTAI Aviation, Applied Optoelectronics, Alaska Air, Astera Labs, United Therapeutics, Circle Internet Group, Granite Construction, Silicon Motion, Intuitive Machines and Apogee Therapeutics. The top ten represented approximately 27.4% of fund assets.

This is important because many of these securities also appear prominently in Frontier's firmwide 13F. The overlap demonstrates that the reported 13F is generated by actual strategy positions spread across multiple client accounts and fund wrappers, not one opaque proprietary vehicle.

The same shareholder report disclosed portfolio turnover of 116% for the reporting period. High turnover is not necessarily negative in a small-cap growth strategy, but it demonstrates that Frontier's "long-term fundamental" philosophy does not mean every position is held passively for years. New information, earnings developments, price moves and relative opportunities can generate substantial trading.

Turnover matters because trading smaller companies incurs market impact. A manager with billions under management must execute gradually and carefully to avoid moving prices. It also creates tax considerations for taxable investors, though institutional pensions and tax-exempt accounts may be less sensitive.

The public AMG fund also makes Frontier's ownership relationship highly visible. The fund is branded "AMG Frontier," while Frontier remains the investment manager. Investors should distinguish the fund sponsor/distributor from the portfolio manager.

INSTITUTIONAL CLIENTS AND A 2026 PUBLIC-PENSION MANDATE

Frontier's target market has historically been institutional rather than retail.

A useful recent example came from the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority Retirement Fund. Public-plan reporting in 2026 recorded a $45 million allocation to Frontier Capital Management for a Small Cap Growth mandate after the retirement system terminated two existing small-cap-growth managers.

This type of mandate is useful external evidence because public pensions generally conduct consultant-supported manager searches, operational review and fee negotiations before allocating capital.

It should not be treated as a guarantee of performance. Institutional investors can terminate managers after poor relative results or strategic changes. But it supports Frontier's claim that its client base includes sophisticated institutions rather than being driven primarily by retail fund sales.

Frontier's separate-account capability is particularly important here. A pension can receive the same underlying strategy without investing through Frontier Small Cap Value LP or another private partnership.

This again explains why firm AUM is much larger than the cumulative Form D amount in any single vehicle.

AMG MAJORITY OWNERSHIP: STABILITY, ECONOMIC ALIGNMENT AND POTENTIAL CONFLICTS

AMG acquired its majority economic interest in Frontier in 2000, making this a relationship with more than a quarter-century of history.

Frontier describes the arrangement as one that preserves its investment and operational autonomy while AMG participates economically as majority owner.

This model has several potential advantages.

A permanent capital partner can reduce succession pressure.

Employees can still own meaningful equity.

The manager does not need to pursue an IPO or sell itself every time the founding generation retires.

AMG can provide institutional resources without centralizing portfolio decisions.

But investors should understand the economic structure.

A portion of Frontier's profitability ultimately belongs to its majority owner.

Compensation, distributions and ownership transfers can affect employee incentives.

If senior investment professionals retire, their equity interests may change.

The relevant diligence question is whether portfolio managers retain sufficient long-term ownership and incentive alignment to protect investment culture.

Frontier's disclosure that 19 of 38 current employees participate in ownership is a positive indicator of broad internal equity participation rather than economics being concentrated exclusively in a small management group.

LEADERSHIP TRANSITION AND WHY FOUNDER DEPENDENCE IS LOWER THAN AT MANY BOUTIQUES

Frontier's age creates succession risk but also provides evidence that succession has already occurred multiple times.

Historical SEC documents from earlier decades identify Michael Cavarretta, Stephen Knightly, Thomas Duncan and other longstanding senior executives in major investment and leadership roles. The current leadership page instead emphasizes Sarah Jankowski, James Colgan, Christopher Scarpa, Peter Kuechle, Jonathan Levin, Greg Jiang and Robert Phay.

That change is important.

Many boutique managers fail when one founder retires because the investment process was never institutionalized.

Frontier has continued operating after multiple portfolio-manager transitions while maintaining the same basic focus on proprietary fundamental research.

Current strategies use co-portfolio-manager structures supported by a centralized analyst team.

This distributes investment responsibility and reduces dependence on one individual.

It does not eliminate succession risk. Experienced analysts can leave. AMG ownership could affect retention. Different generations may interpret the investment discipline differently.

But Frontier's four-decade history is evidence that transition risk has been managed before rather than being purely hypothetical.

RESEARCH MODEL: CENTRALIZED INDUSTRY SPECIALISTS SUPPORT SIX STRATEGIES

Frontier's six strategies are not operated as six isolated investment boutiques.

The manager says every strategy is supported by a centralized team of industry-specialist analysts.

This structure allows one analyst covering an industry to contribute ideas to value, growth, smid and mid-cap portfolios when the opportunity fits different valuation or growth criteria.

For example, one semiconductor company may fit Small Cap Growth because earnings are accelerating.

Another semiconductor company may fit Small Cap Value because temporary weakness has depressed valuation.

A third may fit Capital Appreciation because it combines growth with a reasonable multiple.

The research can therefore be reused without requiring every portfolio manager to build a separate analyst staff.

This creates economies of scale and helps explain how a 38-person organization can manage roughly $11 billion across six strategies.

The risk is correlated thinking.

If the centralized analyst team forms an incorrect view of one industry, several Frontier strategies could own related securities simultaneously.

The firmwide 13F can therefore contain large aggregate positions even when each individual client account is diversified.

FTAI Aviation's $320 million aggregate position is an example of why institutional investors should understand exposures across the organization, not just within one private fund.

SMALL-CAP CAPACITY: THE CENTRAL STRUCTURAL QUESTION FOR AN $11 BILLION SPECIALIST

Capacity is arguably Frontier's most important long-term structural risk.

Small-cap strategies offer potential inefficiency precisely because companies are less widely owned and less liquid.

But those same characteristics limit how much money a manager can deploy.

Frontier currently reports roughly $11 billion of firm assets and $2.5 billion in Small Cap Value alone.

A $2.5 billion strategy cannot meaningfully invest 1% of assets in a company if doing so requires owning an impractically large share of that company's free float.

The manager can address capacity by holding more securities, moving into the upper end of the small-cap universe, closing strategies to new investors, using separate investment vehicles or maintaining position-size limits.

But every solution changes portfolio construction.

A larger number of holdings can dilute the impact of best ideas.

Larger companies can reduce the inefficiency advantage.

A strategy that was highly nimble at $500 million may behave differently at $2.5 billion.

Frontier's continued offering of multiple wrappers therefore deserves capacity scrutiny.

Prospective investors should ask for current strategy capacity limits, historical closures/reopenings and ownership percentages in less-liquid holdings.

LIQUIDITY AND MARKET-IMPACT RISK

Small- and mid-cap securities can trade dramatically less volume than mega-cap equities.

A $50 million position in a stock trading $10 million per day cannot be exited immediately without potential market impact.

This becomes particularly important during recessions or risk-off episodes, when liquidity often disappears at exactly the moment institutional investors seek cash.

Frontier manages separate accounts, private partnerships, collective trusts and registered funds.

Different client types can have different redemption or termination rights.

If several large institutional clients reduce the same strategy simultaneously, the manager must coordinate trading across accounts.

Frontier's historical compliance materials explicitly address trade-allocation procedures, suggesting that equitable execution across clients has long been recognized as an operational issue. Historical compliance documents also address broker selection and soft-dollar practices.

Investors should review the modern version of those policies rather than rely on a 2011 manual, but the historical document provides evidence that Frontier built formal trade-allocation and brokerage controls long ago.

VALUE-TRAP RISK VERSUS GROWTH-VALUATION RISK

Frontier's six strategies expose clients to different forms of valuation risk.

Small Cap Value can buy companies that look cheap because the market anticipates deterioration. If earnings continue falling, the position becomes a value trap.

Small Cap Growth can buy strong businesses at valuations that assume years of rapid growth. If growth slows, multiples can collapse.

Capital Appreciation attempts to balance the two through GARP investing, but reasonable valuation is subjective.

A company growing 30% annually may appear cheap at 30x earnings and expensive at 20x if growth suddenly falls to 10%.

Frontier's advantage must therefore come from fundamental earnings analysis rather than simple valuation screens.

Public portfolios show the manager is willing to own controversial or rapidly changing companies, including airlines, infrastructure companies, semiconductor suppliers, biotechnology firms and newer public technology companies.

That creates genuine alpha opportunity but also meaningful company-specific risk.

AMG FRONTIER SMALL CAP GROWTH TURNOVER AND CYCLICAL EXPOSURE

The 116% turnover reported by the public Small Cap Growth fund for its latest reporting period deserves attention.

Small-cap growth portfolios can change rapidly when earnings expectations shift.

Companies graduating into larger market-cap categories can also be replaced.

IPO and newly public companies can enter the investable universe.

High turnover means Frontier must continuously generate new ideas.

It also means investment results depend partly on trading execution.

The 2026 holdings show significant exposure to cyclical and higher-beta themes such as aviation, AI infrastructure, optical networking, space technology and biotechnology.

These businesses can produce exceptional gains during risk-on markets but experience large drawdowns when capital becomes more expensive.

Investors should therefore evaluate full-cycle volatility, not only recent performance.

The public fund's top ten concentration of 27.4% is moderate compared with concentrated hedge funds, but a large part of risk can still come from factor exposures shared across many holdings.

If multiple companies benefit from AI capex or cyclical industrial spending, nominal diversification may overstate economic diversification.

SERVICE PROVIDERS: NORTHERN TRUST, NORTHEAST RETIREMENT SERVICES AND WOLF & COMPANY

Form ADV-derived private-fund data provides useful operational information for Frontier Small Cap Value Fund LP.

The latest public dataset identifies Northern Trust as custodian, Northeast Retirement Services as administrator and Wolf & Company P.C. as auditor.

It also reports annual auditing and 100% of fund assets as independently valued in the relevant regulatory data.

These relationships strengthen the fund's operating profile because custody, investor accounting and financial-statement audit are not concentrated entirely inside Frontier.

Northern Trust is a major global custody institution.

Northeast Retirement Services specializes in fund and retirement-plan administration.

Wolf & Company is a long-established New England accounting firm with financial-services and investment-management clients.

The service-provider information should still be confirmed from the latest audited 2026 statements because providers can change after the last ADV reporting date.

Frontier Capital Appreciation Fund and other private vehicles may also have different providers, so FilingDossier should not automatically copy the Small Cap Value provider stack across every Frontier vehicle.

NEW BOSTON HEADQUARTERS AND ENTITY CONTINUITY

Frontier moved from 99 Summer Street, 19th Floor, Boston, Massachusetts 02110 to One Liberty Square, 10th Floor, Boston, Massachusetts 02109 effective September 1, 2026.

The timing is important because older Form ADV, 13F and fund filings still show 99 Summer Street while the September 2026 Form D amendments already use One Liberty Square.

This is not evidence of two Frontier Capital Management companies.

The telephone number remains 617-261-0777.

The same executives appear.

The same SEC identifiers remain in use.

The official website explicitly announces the move.

For Google entity resolution, both addresses should therefore be preserved as current/historical rather than treated as conflicting records.

The Q2 2026 13F still used 99 Summer Street because that filing predates the September move.

Later Form D filings correctly use One Liberty Square.

This type of date-sensitive address matching is important for avoiding false "address mismatch" risk flags.

BETTER HOME & FINANCE: CURRENT 13G EVIDENCE OF SIGNIFICANT OWNERSHIP

Frontier also continues to appear in SEC beneficial-ownership filings outside Form 13F.

In May and August 2026, Frontier filed amended Schedule 13G reports concerning Better Home & Finance Holding Company. The filings directly identify Frontier Capital Management Company LLC as the reporting investor under CIK 0000351173.

These filings are useful because they demonstrate that Frontier can build positions sufficiently large to trigger beneficial-ownership reporting.

Large ownership can improve the economic impact of successful research but increases liquidity sensitivity.

A manager holding several percent of a small company cannot always sell without affecting price.

Schedule 13G is generally a passive ownership filing rather than the activist Schedule 13D structure, so the filing should not be interpreted as evidence that Frontier is pursuing activist control.

This distinction separates Frontier from activist managers such as Harvest/No Street, even though both may hold significant percentages of smaller companies.

REGULATORY AND NEGATIVE-EVIDENCE REVIEW

Frontier's regulatory history is unusually long. IAPD records show SEC registration effective January 14, 1981.

The reviewed current primary sources did not reveal a defining SEC fraud enforcement action against Frontier Capital Management Company LLC or its current leadership.

That statement should remain narrow. A large adviser operating for more than four decades can encounter examinations, commercial disputes or employment matters that do not become headline enforcement actions.

The most visible current risks are investment and organizational rather than basic legitimacy.

Frontier manages a large asset base inside relatively less-liquid market-cap segments.

Several strategies can own similar names.

AMG holds a majority economic interest.

Leadership has transitioned across generations.

Some registered products have high turnover.

Active small-cap strategies can spend long periods out of favor relative to passive mega-cap indexes.

None of these represents misconduct. They are the issues institutional LPs should actually evaluate.

REGULATORY NAME CONFUSION: DO NOT MIX THIS FIRM WITH FRONTIER CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, INC.

A particularly important search issue is the existence of another entity named Frontier Capital Management, Inc., CRD 114073.

IAPD currently shows that entity as not registered, with a historical Kansas registration terminated in 2010.

That is not the Boston manager covered in this article.

The correct institutional manager is:

Frontier Capital Management Company, LLC CRD 106274 SEC 801-15724 CIK 0000351173 Boston, Massachusetts frontiercap.com Founded 1980 Majority-owned by AMG

Search engines and automated compliance systems can easily merge the two because their names differ only by "Company, LLC" versus "Inc."

FilingDossier should explicitly separate them.

The inactive Frontier Capital Management, Inc. record should never be used to claim that Boston-based Frontier Capital Management Company LLC has lost its SEC registration.

The current Boston adviser remains SEC approved in IAPD and continues to file 13F and ownership reports in 2026.

FINAL ASSESSMENT

Frontier Small Cap Value, L.P. belongs to one of the longest-operating active small/mid-cap equity boutiques in the United States. The partnership's SEC history extends back to a January 2004 first sale, and its September 17, 2026 Form D amendment reports $83,987,568 sold to 71 investors under Rule 506(b) and Section 3(c)(1).

The private fund is only a small part of Frontier's overall business. Frontier currently reports approximately $11 billion in firmwide assets, while the Small Cap Value strategy alone reports approximately $2.5 billion as of June 30, 2026. The same strategy is offered through separate accounts, the private LP and a collective investment trust.

Frontier Capital Management Company LLC has been SEC registered since 1981 under CRD 106274 / SEC 801-15724. The manager's Q2 2026 13F disclosed approximately $10.73 billion of U.S. long equities, independently supporting the firm's current scale. Leading aggregate holdings included FTAI Aviation, Granite Construction, Alaska Air, Applied Optoelectronics and Akamai.

The broader fund family adds further verification. Frontier Capital Appreciation Fund LP filed its own September 2026 amendment showing approximately $239.32 million sold to 51 investors and a first sale dating to 2005. Registered and institutional Frontier mandates have operated for decades, including a predecessor Capital Appreciation strategy dating to 1996.

Frontier's ownership model is also unusually stable. AMG has held a majority interest since 2000, while Frontier reports that 19 of 38 employees currently participate in equity ownership. Current leadership spans portfolio management, research, operations, compliance, finance and cybersecurity rather than depending on one founder.

The investment proposition is nevertheless not risk free. An $11 billion organization specializing in smaller U.S. companies must actively manage capacity and liquidity. Small-cap value can suffer from value traps; growth strategies can suffer severe multiple compression. Public-fund data shows meaningful turnover, demonstrating that implementation and trading costs matter. Several strategies can also hold the same companies, creating firmwide concentration even when each individual portfolio appears diversified.

Operational evidence for the Small Cap Value private fund is credible, with public regulatory-derived records identifying Northern Trust, Northeast Retirement Services and Wolf & Company in custody, administration and audit roles. These relationships should be reconfirmed against current statements.

The firm's September 2026 headquarters move from 99 Summer Street to One Liberty Square is legitimate and explicitly confirmed by Frontier's website and latest Form D filings. Old and new addresses should not be treated as conflicting identities.

For prospective investors, the key documents are current audited returns, benchmark-relative alpha over full cycles, capacity analysis, current portfolio liquidity, turnover, realized trading costs, largest ownership stakes, fee terms, redemption provisions and current service-provider confirmations.

The central diligence issue is not whether Frontier is genuine. It is whether a large, mature fundamental manager can continue extracting inefficiencies from U.S. small- and mid-cap equities at an approximately $11 billion organizational scale while preserving the research culture that has defined the firm since 1980.

SEC SNAPSHOT

Issuer: Frontier Small Cap Value, L.P. Historical SEC Name: Frontier Small Value L.P. CIK: 0001287840 SEC File Number: 021-64725 Entity Type: Limited Partnership Jurisdiction: Delaware First Sale: January 1, 2004 Latest Form D: Form D/A Latest Filing Date: September 17, 2026 Signature Date: September 16, 2026 Current Address: One Liberty Square, 10th Floor, Boston, MA 02109 Historical Address: 99 Summer Street, 19th Floor, Boston, MA 02110 Phone: 617-261-0777 Fund Classification: Pooled Investment Fund / Other Investment Fund Offering Exemption: Regulation D Rule 506(b) Investment Company Act Exclusion: Section 3(c)(1) Offering Size: Indefinite Total Amount Sold: $83,987,568 Investors: 71 Regulatory Minimum on Latest Form D: $0 Sales Commissions: $0 Finder's Fees: $0 Latest Form D Signatory: Robert E. Phay Jr. Signatory Role: Chief Compliance Officer & General Counsel Other Current Related Executive: Sarah J. Jankowski Investment Manager: Frontier Capital Management Company, LLC Manager CRD: 106274 Manager SEC File: 801-15724 Manager CIK: 0000351173 Manager 13F File Number: 028-01185 SEC Registration Effective: January 14, 1981 Firm Founded: 1980 Official Website: frontiercap.com Current Public Firmwide Assets: Approximately $11 billion Current Employees: 38 Employees Participating in Ownership: 19 Majority Owner: Affiliated Managers Group, Inc. / AMG affiliate AMG Majority Investment: Since 2000 Primary Investment Universe: U.S. Small-Cap, Smid-Cap and Mid-Cap Equities Number of Core Strategies: 6 Strategies: Small Cap Value; Smid Cap Value; Small Cap Growth; Mid Cap Growth; Capital Appreciation; Focus Small Cap Value Strategy Inception: January 1, 1999 Small Cap Value Strategy Assets: Approximately $2.5 billion as of June 30, 2026 Small Cap Value Portfolio Managers: Rushan "Greg" Jiang, CFA; Emmanuel "Manny" Franjul Small Cap Value Investment Style: Relative Value / Fundamental Bottom-Up Small Cap Value Vehicles: Separate Account; Limited Partnership; Collective Investment Trust Current Private Fund GAV Evidence: Approximately $115 million for Small Cap Value LP in latest public Form ADV-derived dataset Private Fund Stated Minimum in ADV-Derived Data: Approximately $1 million Private Fund Custodian Evidence: Northern Trust Private Fund Administrator Evidence: Northeast Retirement Services Private Fund Auditor Evidence: Wolf & Company P.C. Assets Independently Valued in Regulatory-Derived Record: 100% Current Managing Partner / COO: Sarah J. Jankowski Current CCO / General Counsel: Robert E. Phay Jr. Current Investment Leadership Includes: James A. Colgan; Christopher J. Scarpa; Peter G. Kuechle; Jonathan M. Levin, MD; Rushan Jiang Centralized Research Model: Industry-specialist analyst team supporting all six strategies Related Private Fund: Frontier Capital Appreciation Fund, L.P. Capital Appreciation Fund CIK: 0001378092 Capital Appreciation First Sale: December 1, 2005 Capital Appreciation Latest Form D: September 17, 2026 Capital Appreciation Total Amount Sold: $239,324,052 Capital Appreciation Investors: 51 Capital Appreciation Exclusion: Section 3(c)(7) Capital Appreciation Strategy Style: Growth at a Reasonable Price / Fundamental Research Registered Capital Appreciation Portfolio Managers: Andrew B. Bennett; Peter G. Kuechle Predecessor Capital Appreciation Management History: Since January 5, 1996 Latest Form 13F Period: June 30, 2026 Latest Form 13F Filing Date: August 14, 2026 Latest Firmwide 13F Value: Approximately $10.73 billion Prior Quarter 13F Value: Approximately $9.73 billion Largest Q2 2026 Aggregate Position: FTAI Aviation FTAI Aviation Position Value: Approximately $320.17 million Other Major Aggregate Holdings: Granite Construction; Alaska Air Group; Applied Optoelectronics; Akamai Technologies Granite Construction Position: Approximately $176.87 million Alaska Air Position: Approximately $176.68 million Applied Optoelectronics Position: Approximately $144.50 million Akamai Position: Approximately $134.35 million Current 2026 Schedule 13G Example: Better Home & Finance Holding Company Public Registered Product: AMG Frontier Small Cap Growth Fund AMG Frontier Small Cap Growth Net Assets at April 30, 2026: Approximately $98.24 million AMG Frontier Small Cap Growth Holdings: 124 AMG Frontier Small Cap Growth Latest Reported Turnover: 116% AMG Frontier Small Cap Growth Top-10 Concentration: Approximately 27.4% Representative Public-Fund Holdings: FTAI Aviation; Applied Optoelectronics; Alaska Air; Astera Labs; United Therapeutics; Circle Internet Group; Granite Construction; Silicon Motion; Intuitive Machines; Apogee Therapeutics Current Institutional Mandate Evidence: MBTA Retirement Fund approved approximately $45 million for Frontier Small Cap Growth in 2026 Headquarters Move Effective: September 1, 2026 Old Headquarters: 99 Summer Street, Boston New Headquarters: One Liberty Square, Boston Main Risks: Small-cap liquidity, strategy capacity, market impact, style cyclicality, value traps, growth multiple compression, institutional redemptions, firmwide overlapping positions, high turnover in some strategies, portfolio-manager succession and economic dependence on key investment personnel Major Public SEC Enforcement Identified in Reviewed Current Sources: No defining manager-level SEC fraud enforcement action identified; this does not establish absence of examinations or private disputes Entity Confusion Warning: Do not confuse Frontier Capital Management Company, LLC, CRD 106274 / SEC 801-15724, with Frontier Capital Management, Inc., CRD 114073, whose historical Kansas registration is terminated. Duplicate Brand Rule: Frontier Small Cap Value LP, Frontier Capital Appreciation Fund LP and other pooled vehicles managed by Frontier Capital Management Company LLC, together with Frontier/AMG-branded small-, smid- and mid-cap mandates, should be treated as one Frontier Capital Management brand for FilingDossier deduplication unless a specifically requested vehicle requires separate analysis. Independent Conclusion: Frontier Small Cap Value LP is a highly verifiable private investment partnership within a 46-year-old Boston equity-management platform. The latest Form D reports $83.99 million sold to 71 investors, but Frontier's actual institutional scale is far larger: approximately $11 billion firmwide, $2.5 billion in Small Cap Value strategy assets and approximately $10.73 billion of U.S.-listed securities in its June 2026 Form 13F. SEC registration since 1981, AMG majority ownership since 2000, institutional mandates, current public holdings and established third-party custody/administration/audit relationships provide strong evidence of operational maturity. The central diligence questions concern performance, liquidity, capacity, turnover and succession rather than whether Frontier and its funds genuinely operate.

Independent research summary based on SEC Form D, Form ADV/IAPD, Form 13F, Schedule 13G, Frontier Capital Management first-party disclosures, registered-fund SEC filings and public institutional mandate records. Form D, SEC adviser registration, AMG ownership, public holdings and institutional mandates do not constitute SEC approval, verification of investment performance or a guarantee of investor returns.

Verification note: SEC.gov and the relevant regulator's official records remain authoritative. This site's research is independent editorial content.