That difference is important.
Public bond investors normally buy securities after terms have been established by the issuer and underwriting banks.
A direct lender can negotiate terms before capital is committed.
This can include:
Interest rate Maturity Amortization Collateral Financial covenants Restricted payments Minimum liquidity Cash sweeps Change-of-control provisions Information rights Default protections Prepayment economics
Carlyle says CICF II focuses on below-investment-grade opportunities using a relative-value framework. The broader infrastructure credit platform invests across investment-grade, below-investment-grade and mezzanine debt.
Below-investment-grade infrastructure can provide higher yields than highly rated utility or project bonds, but it introduces greater default and restructuring risk.
The attraction is that infrastructure borrowers often own tangible or contractually valuable assets.
A power plant, data center, fiber network, airport-related asset or water facility may retain economic value even if the borrower experiences financial stress.
Hard assets can improve recovery outcomes, but collateral should not be confused with guaranteed principal protection.
An unfinished energy project may be worth dramatically less than its development cost.
A data center without adequate contracted customers or power capacity may have poor recovery value.
An obsolete telecom network can lose strategic value rapidly.
Carlyle therefore needs to underwrite not only current cash flow but asset durability.
The fund's floating-rate loans can benefit investors when base rates remain high because coupons reset upward. But higher rates also increase debt-service burdens on portfolio companies.
The same mechanism that raises lender yield can weaken borrower credit quality.
DIGITAL INFRASTRUCTURE, AI POWER DEMAND AND A RAPIDLY GROWING CREDIT OPPORTUNITY
Digital infrastructure is one of the most important contemporary areas inside Carlyle's infrastructure credit mandate.
Data centers, fiber networks and telecommunications infrastructure require enormous capital investment.
Generative AI has accelerated this trend.
Training and serving increasingly large AI models requires GPUs, specialized networking, cooling systems and huge amounts of electricity.
The resulting capital requirements can exceed what traditional bank markets or corporate balance sheets comfortably finance.
Private infrastructure credit can fill that gap.
But AI-related infrastructure is not automatically low risk.
Data-center assets can be highly concentrated around a few hyperscale customers.
Long construction periods can expose projects to cost inflation.
Grid interconnection can delay commissioning.
Equipment can become technologically outdated.
Electricity shortages can limit utilization.
A facility designed around one generation of computing architecture may require significant future capital expenditure.
Long-term contracted revenue from high-quality counterparties can materially reduce these risks, which is why underwriting contract quality is critical.
The most attractive infrastructure credit transaction may therefore not be the project with the highest headline yield. It may be one where Carlyle receives strong collateral and covenant protection around predictable cash flows while still earning a premium for complexity.
ENERGY TRANSITION, LOW-CARBON POWER AND THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN POLICY SUPPORT AND CREDIT QUALITY
Carlyle explicitly includes energy transition and low-carbon power in CICF II's target sectors.
That opportunity is enormous but complicated.
Renewables, storage, grid upgrades and distributed energy infrastructure require trillions of dollars globally.
Government policy can accelerate deployment through tax credits, grants and favorable regulation.
However, infrastructure lenders still face project-specific risks.
Solar and wind projects can experience equipment failures, curtailment, transmission constraints and merchant power-price exposure.
Battery-storage economics depend on utilization, power-market volatility and degradation.
Emerging energy technologies can face technological or construction risks not present in mature infrastructure.
Policy itself can change.
Tax incentives can be modified.
Permitting regimes can tighten.
Import tariffs can increase equipment costs.
A private credit manager therefore cannot underwrite an asset purely because it carries an "energy transition" label.
Carlyle's relative-value mandate potentially allows the fund to choose where risk compensation is most attractive rather than being forced to lend only to one preferred technology.
That flexibility can be valuable because infrastructure credit markets regularly move between periods of intense lender competition and periods where capital becomes scarce.
TRANSPORTATION, LOGISTICS, WATER AND ESSENTIAL SERVICES
CICF II is deliberately broader than energy and digital infrastructure.
Transportation and logistics assets can include ports, logistics networks, mobility infrastructure and assets supporting global trade.
These businesses can have predictable long-term demand but may remain economically sensitive.
A toll road, airport-related asset or logistics facility can experience sharp short-term volume reductions during recessions or disruptions.
Water and waste businesses have different characteristics.
Demand is often less cyclical because communities and businesses require these services regardless of economic conditions.
Assets may operate under long concessions or regulated structures.
But environmental liability can be significant.
Treatment standards can change.
Capital expenditure can exceed forecasts.
Municipal counterparties may face financial constraints.
Social infrastructure and other essential services may benefit from long-dated contracts but can be sensitive to government funding.
The fund's diversification across infrastructure types can therefore reduce dependence on one commodity or technology.
It cannot eliminate correlation during broad financial stress because all private credit portfolios still depend on financing markets, refinancing availability and investor risk appetite.
FROM $1.006 BILLION FORM D TO $2.3 BILLION FINAL CLOSE: UNDERSTANDING THE FUNDRAISING DATA
One of the most important diligence points in this article is the apparent difference between SEC and manager-disclosed fundraising figures.
The January 5, 2026 Form D reported:
$1,006,273,135 sold 3 investors Indefinite offering Rule 506(b) Section 3(c)(7) First sale December 22, 2023
Eight months later, Carlyle announced approximately $2.3 billion of total commitments at final close.
These numbers should not be treated as competing estimates of the same snapshot.
Form D is an exempt-offering notice.
It can capture capital sold under a particular U.S. offering exemption and does not necessarily include all non-U.S. or parallel capital.
The Form D filing itself was also eight months before final close.
The September announcement says the investor base spans North America, Europe and Asia and includes sophisticated institutional investors.
A global private-markets fund can involve domestic partnerships, offshore partnerships, parallel funds, feeders, co-investment vehicles and other structures.
This is why FilingDossier should use the following wording:
Latest SEC Form D amount observed: approximately $1.006 billion as of January 5, 2026. Final total capital commitments announced by Carlyle: approximately $2.3 billion as of September 14, 2026.
The latter is the better current indicator of the complete Fund II fundraising program.
Neither number is current NAV.
Commitments are promises to contribute capital when called.
Only part of that capital may have been invested.
At final close, Carlyle said CICF II had approximately $500 million committed across six investments.
That means much of the $2.3 billion fundraising capacity remained undeployed.
Deployment pace will be a major determinant of returns.
Deploy too quickly and underwriting standards can decline.
Deploy too slowly and investors can experience lower effective returns or prolonged commitment periods.
PLATFORM SCALE: $8.7 BILLION INFRASTRUCTURE CREDIT, $211 BILLION GLOBAL CREDIT AND $485 BILLION CARLYLE
Fund II benefits from operating inside a very large sourcing organization.
As of September 2026, Carlyle said Infrastructure Credit managed approximately $8.7 billion.
At June 30, Carlyle's broader Global Credit segment reported approximately $211.1 billion AUM and $167.6 billion of fee-earning AUM.
That platform includes liquid credit, direct lending, opportunistic credit, asset-backed finance, aviation finance, infrastructure credit, real-estate credit, insurance-related strategies and cross-platform credit.
The entire Carlyle Group reported approximately $485.5 billion AUM at June 30:
Global Private Equity: approximately $162.7 billion Global Credit: approximately $211.1 billion Carlyle AlpInvest: approximately $111.7 billion
Carlyle also reported more than 2,500 employees and 28 offices across four continents.
Scale can help CICF II in several ways.
Carlyle buyout and infrastructure teams can generate proprietary relationships.
Credit professionals can compare infrastructure opportunities with other credit markets.
Global capital-markets teams can assist in structuring.
Sector teams can help underwrite technology, energy, industrial and transportation risks.
Portfolio companies can create financing relationships.
But scale also creates conflicts.
A single company or project might simultaneously be relevant to Carlyle equity, private credit, infrastructure credit, insurance accounts or separately managed accounts.
The manager must decide which vehicle receives the opportunity and on what terms.
Large alternative platforms therefore need formal allocation policies.
Scale improves sourcing but makes conflict governance more important.
TCG CAPITAL MARKETS AND THE FUNDRAISING CHANNEL
The latest Form D names TCG Capital Markets L.L.C., CRD 291767, as a sales-compensation recipient.
TCG Capital Markets is an affiliated Carlyle broker-dealer/distribution entity.
The filing lists solicitation across all U.S. states.
It reports $0 in fund-paid sales commissions and finder's fees.
The filing separately explains that certain employees of an affiliate of the GP can receive compensation partly based on capital raised, but that such compensation is borne by Carlyle rather than the fund's investors.
This is a useful operational detail because it demonstrates that fundraising is embedded inside a regulated distribution structure rather than relying on an unidentified third-party finder.
Still, investors should examine all fund expenses.
The absence of a Form D commission does not mean investors pay no organizational, management, financing, legal, administration or other fund-level costs.
Private credit returns are sensitive to fees because gross yields can look attractive while net returns decline after management fees, carried interest and expenses.
Investors should request the exact management-fee rate, preferred return, carry, organizational expense cap and treatment of transaction fees.
THE $2.3 BILLION FUND VERSUS THE $500 MILLION CURRENT PORTFOLIO
The final-close announcement provides a valuable deployment snapshot.
CICF II had six investments and approximately $500 million of capital committed when Carlyle announced the $2.3 billion close.
This suggests the fund remained relatively early in its investment period.
Approximately $500 million across six investments implies average commitments in the tens of millions, although actual exposures are almost certainly uneven.
The early-stage portfolio creates both opportunity and uncertainty.
Most of the eventual fund has not yet been assembled.
Current performance therefore tells investors little about what the mature fund will ultimately look like.
Future market conditions can materially change portfolio construction.
If credit spreads widen, Carlyle may obtain stronger pricing and covenants.
If private credit fundraising remains extremely strong, competition could compress spreads and weaken lender protections.
Infrastructure credit also has a long deployment cycle because transactions can require technical, environmental, regulatory and legal diligence.
Investors should not judge execution solely by speed.
A slower deployment process can be appropriate when underwriting long-lived assets.
FIRST FUND VERSUS FUND II: RAPID SCALE-UP
Carlyle describes CICF II as more than three times larger than its predecessor.
That is a meaningful increase in strategy size.
Fundraising growth can signal strong institutional demand and confidence in the prior strategy.
It can also create capacity questions.
A strategy that worked with a substantially smaller pool of capital must now originate enough attractive transactions to deploy $2.3 billion while maintaining underwriting discipline.
Infrastructure lending can absorb large tickets, which makes capacity less restrictive than small-cap equity or venture capital.
Individual data-center, power and transportation projects can require hundreds of millions or billions of dollars.
Carlyle can also syndicate or co-invest.
Nevertheless, larger fund size creates pressure to do larger or more numerous deals.
Investors should compare Fund I and Fund II by:
Gross and net IRR DPI Current yield Loss ratio Non-accrual rate Realized credit losses Average loan-to-value Average attachment point Sector concentration Fixed versus floating-rate exposure Investment-grade versus below-investment-grade mix
Public fundraising announcements do not provide these metrics.
PRIVATE CREDIT DEFAULT AND RECOVERY RISK
The strongest marketing argument for infrastructure debt is essentiality.
People need electricity, data connectivity, water and transportation.
That does not mean infrastructure borrowers cannot default.
Credit losses can arise from excessive leverage, construction delays, weak sponsors, regulatory change, commodity exposure or refinancing failure.
A lender's ultimate protection depends on documentation and collateral.
Senior secured debt generally has better recovery prospects than subordinated or mezzanine capital.
CICF II can operate across the capital structure, which creates flexibility but also means not all investments will have identical downside protection.
Higher-yield mezzanine debt may absorb losses before senior lenders.
Project finance structures can isolate assets from sponsors, which can be positive for ring-fencing but reduces access to broader corporate resources if the project fails.
Investors should therefore avoid judging the fund only by average coupon.
A 12% loan with weak collateral can be less attractive than a 9% loan with strong contractual protection.
REFINANCING AND MATURITY RISK
Infrastructure assets are long lived.
Debt maturities are shorter.
That creates refinancing risk.
A project can operate successfully but still encounter trouble if debt matures when capital markets are closed or interest rates are dramatically higher.
This is especially important for below-investment-grade borrowers.
Carlyle's underwriting must evaluate not just whether a borrower can service debt today, but whether it can refinance or amortize debt over time.
Floating-rate loans introduce another dimension.
Higher rates benefit current lender income but can weaken borrower coverage ratios.
If rates remain elevated longer than expected, projects initially underwritten with comfortable interest coverage can become stressed.
A well-structured credit agreement can require hedging or minimum coverage levels.
Investors should understand how CICF II manages interest-rate risk at both portfolio and borrower level.
CONSTRUCTION RISK VERSUS OPERATING-ASSET RISK
Not all infrastructure debt finances operating assets.
Some transactions fund development or construction.
Construction-stage loans can offer attractive returns because risk is higher.
Cost overruns Supply-chain delays Permitting Contractor failure Technology performance Interconnection delays
can all prevent an asset from reaching operation on schedule.
Once an infrastructure asset is fully operating under a long-term contract, credit risk can decline materially.
The mature asset can often be refinanced at lower rates.
This creates an opportunity for private credit funds: provide expensive flexible capital during development or transition, then receive repayment after de-risking.
But if construction fails, lender recovery can depend on partially completed assets whose value is difficult to determine.
CICF II investors should therefore examine the portfolio's construction-versus-operating exposure.
AI INFRASTRUCTURE AND POWER: OPPORTUNITY CAN ALSO CREATE CONCENTRATION
The dramatic growth of AI is creating unusually large investment requirements for data centers, transmission and power generation.
Carlyle's scale places it in a strong position to finance that ecosystem.
But private markets broadly have begun concentrating enormous amounts of capital into AI-related infrastructure.
Data-center operators need power.
Power developers need grid connections.
GPU clusters require expensive hardware.
Fiber networks require expansion.
If every private-credit manager reaches the same conclusion, competition can reduce yields and weaken terms.
There is also a risk that projected AI demand proves too optimistic.
Infrastructure can have 20- to 40-year useful lives.
Technology demand forecasts can change much faster.
Credit underwriting must therefore avoid assuming that every data-center or power project will remain fully utilized simply because current AI spending is strong.
RELATED CARLYLE TRANSACTIONS AND WHY THEY ARE USEFUL BUT SHOULD NOT BE AUTOMATICALLY ATTRIBUTED TO CICF II
Carlyle's Global Credit platform remained highly active during 2026.
In September, Carlyle announced a forward-flow partnership to purchase up to $425 million of newly originated residential solar loans from Sungage Financial, with Goldman Sachs providing financing.
In July, Carlyle announced financing supporting Francisco Partners' acquisition of Blackline Safety.
Other Carlyle credit teams are active across asset-backed finance, corporate private credit, real estate and aviation.
These transactions demonstrate the sourcing capability of Carlyle Global Credit.
However, FilingDossier should not state that every Carlyle credit transaction is an investment of CICF II.
Large platforms frequently allocate individual transactions to specific funds, SMAs, insurance accounts or co-investment vehicles.
Unless Carlyle explicitly names CICF II in a deal announcement, a transaction should be described as evidence of platform activity—not automatically as a Fund II holding.
This distinction is especially important for Google entity accuracy.
CARLYLE'S 2025 SEC RECORDKEEPING SETTLEMENT
A complete diligence article should not omit Carlyle's recent regulatory history.
On January 13, 2025, the SEC announced a settlement involving Carlyle Investment Management L.L.C., Carlyle Global Credit Investment Management L.L.C. and AlpInvest Partners B.V. as part of an industry-wide investigation into off-channel electronic communications.
The Carlyle entities agreed to pay a combined $8.5 million civil penalty.
The SEC found that personnel, including senior employees, used personal devices and unapproved communication platforms for business communications that were required to be preserved.
The SEC also found failures to maintain those records and reasonably supervise personnel for compliance with recordkeeping policies.
This was a books-and-records / supervision case.
It was not a finding that CICF II committed investment fraud, misappropriated assets or falsified portfolio performance.
The distinction is important.
The settlement is nevertheless relevant because infrastructure credit operates inside Carlyle's Global Credit platform, and one of the settling entities was Carlyle Global Credit Investment Management.
A sophisticated LP should therefore include communications retention, compliance surveillance and governance in operational diligence.
Carlyle's own regulatory filings disclose that large asset-management businesses are regularly subject to SEC, DOJ, FINRA, FCA and other examinations and inquiries.
PLATFORM CONFLICTS: ONE CARLYLE, MANY ACCOUNTS
Carlyle's size creates an extensive conflict landscape.
A single infrastructure opportunity could potentially be relevant to:
CICF II Other infrastructure credit funds Insurance-related capital Separately managed accounts Carlyle Tactical Credit Asset-backed finance Global Private Equity infrastructure funds Co-investment vehicles Portfolio-company financing
The manager must allocate opportunities fairly.
Different funds can also invest in different levels of the same borrower's capital structure.
One Carlyle vehicle could theoretically own equity while another owns debt.
If the borrower becomes stressed, their economic interests may diverge.
The equity investor may favor additional risk or restructuring.
The senior lender may prioritize capital preservation.
Large multi-strategy firms maintain conflict committees, information barriers and allocation procedures to manage these situations.
But the conflict cannot be eliminated simply because both vehicles belong to one organization.
Prospective CICF II investors should review the conflicts section of the PPM closely.
CARLYLE PRIVATE EQUITY PARTNERS FUND IS A DIFFERENT 2025-2026 VEHICLE
Search engines now also surface Carlyle Private Equity Partners Fund, L.P., CIK 0002065337.
That is a separate vehicle and should not be merged with CICF II.
CPEP was formed in 2025 and has become a reporting fund with periodic 10-K, 10-Q and 8-K filings.
For example, in June 2026 CPEP reported approximately $16.4 million of new unit sales in a monthly subscription cycle.
The fund also has multiple unit classes, an incentive allocation and redemption structure.
CICF II is different.
It is a traditional closed-end-style institutional infrastructure credit fund focused on privately originated loans and infrastructure debt.
For FilingDossier SEO, the distinction matters because Carlyle has hundreds of similarly named legal vehicles.
CIK and strategy must always remain attached to the fund name.
CARLYLE ALPINVEST AND WHY IT SHOULD NOT BE MERGED INTO CICF II RESEARCH
Carlyle AlpInvest is another enormous business but operates a fundamentally different strategy.
In July 2026 Carlyle AlpInvest closed Atom Fund II at its $1.7 billion hard cap for single-asset continuation vehicle transactions.
AlpInvest's total AUM was approximately $111.7 billion at June 30.
Those numbers demonstrate Carlyle's institutional scale but should not be used as evidence of CICF II's portfolio or performance.
The same applies to Carlyle buyout funds, aviation funds, BDCs and real-estate credit.
They share the Carlyle parent platform.
They do not share identical investments or risk.
A high-quality research article should therefore explain platform resources while preserving fund-specific boundaries.
MANAGEMENT FEES, CARRY AND NET-RETURN RISK
Carlyle's public corporate filings explain that closed-end Global Private Equity and Global Credit carry funds generally provide the manager with performance allocations around 20% after returning invested capital, preferred returns generally around 7%-9% and applicable fund costs, although terms vary materially by vehicle.
This does not prove CICF II uses exactly these percentages.
The specific LPA controls.
Infrastructure credit investors should nevertheless focus heavily on fee drag.
Private credit often produces lower gross returns than buyout equity.
A fee structure appropriate for a 25% gross-return buyout strategy can consume a larger proportion of a credit strategy producing low-double-digit returns.
Fund expenses, commitment fees on undrawn capital, management fees, performance allocation, financing costs and transaction expenses can materially change net IRR.
Investors should request a full gross-to-net bridge from Fund I and explicit Fund II fee terms.
SERVICE PROVIDERS AND OPERATIONAL DUE DILIGENCE
CICF II's Form D identifies Carlyle affiliates and TCG Capital Markets but does not provide the complete list of third-party administrator, auditor, custodian, banking counterparties and legal counsel.
A Carlyle-scale organization obviously operates extensive institutional infrastructure, but investors should still verify the providers specific to this legal fund.
Private infrastructure credit requires particularly complex administration because loan cash flows can include:
Interest PIK interest Origination fees OID Commitment fees Prepayments Amortization Equity kickers Hedging Currency exposure Restructuring proceeds
Valuation is also less straightforward than public bonds.
Private loans do not trade every day.
Managers use discounted-cash-flow models, comparable credit spreads, third-party pricing and transaction information.
The valuation process affects reported NAV, performance fees and portfolio monitoring.
Institutional LPs should review the independent valuation policy and auditor's treatment of Level 3 assets.
LIQUIDITY AND FUND DURATION
Infrastructure debt can be highly illiquid.
Loans may have multi-year or multi-decade maturities.
There may be no active secondary market.
This illiquidity is partly why borrowers pay a premium.
It is also why the asset class is better suited to long-duration institutional capital.
Investors should not expect hedge-fund-style liquidity.
Fund documents should be reviewed for commitment period, investment period, term, extension rights, distribution policy and recycling provisions.
An infrastructure loan can remain outstanding for years even when the underlying asset performs as expected.
That means investors need to match the fund with long-term liquidity needs.
FINAL ASSESSMENT
Carlyle Infrastructure Credit Fund II is one of the strongest institutional private-fund profiles in the current FilingDossier pipeline.
The fund was formed in Delaware in 2023 and began selling interests on December 22, 2023. Its January 5, 2026 Form D/A reports $1,006,273,135 sold to three investors under Rule 506(b) and Section 3(c)(7), with TCG Capital Markets appearing in the distribution structure.
The most important current development occurred on September 14, 2026, when Carlyle announced the final close of CICF II at approximately $2.3 billion, above its $2 billion target and more than three times larger than its predecessor. The investor base spans North America, Europe and Asia.
The fund was not fully deployed at close. Carlyle reported six investments with approximately $500 million committed, leaving significant capital available for future opportunities.
Its manager platform is exceptionally large. Carlyle Infrastructure Credit now manages approximately $8.7 billion. Carlyle Global Credit had $211.1 billion of AUM at June 30, while The Carlyle Group had approximately $485.5 billion across all three segments.
The investment team is led by Erik Savi, who previously built or led infrastructure credit businesses at BlackRock and MetLife and worked at Merrill Lynch and WestLB, together with Deputy Global Head Manish Taneja, whose background includes Wells Fargo, WestLB and Credit Suisse First Boston. The dedicated platform covers direct origination across power, energy transition, digital infrastructure, transportation, water/waste, telecom and other essential infrastructure.
The investment case rests on a genuine structural opportunity: infrastructure requires enormous long-term financing, while bank balance-sheet and regulatory constraints have increased the role of institutional private capital.
But infrastructure credit is not inherently safe.
Below-investment-grade borrowers can default.
Construction projects can run over budget.
Data-center demand can disappoint.
Energy-transition economics can change with policy.
Floating-rate debt can strain borrowers.
Asset values can fall.
Refinancing markets can close.
CICF II's large size also means Carlyle must find enough attractive transactions without sacrificing credit discipline.
The platform's size creates sourcing advantages but also conflicts among multiple Carlyle funds and accounts.
Regulatory diligence should also include Carlyle's January 2025 SEC settlement. Carlyle Investment Management, Carlyle Global Credit Investment Management and AlpInvest Partners paid a combined $8.5 million penalty in connection with failures to preserve off-channel communications and related supervision. That case concerned books and records rather than CICF II investment fraud, but it remains relevant to operational governance.
Prospective LPs should focus on Fund I performance, realized loss history, gross-to-net returns, Fund II fee and carry terms, loan-to-value, attachment points, fixed versus floating rates, industry concentration, project-development exposure, construction risk, non-accruals, valuation methodology, conflict allocation, fund-level leverage and current service providers.
CICF II's legal identity and Carlyle relationship are exceptionally well supported. The main investment question is whether Carlyle can convert its massive origination network and infrastructure expertise into attractive credit returns without giving up underwriting discipline as the strategy scales.
SEC SNAPSHOT
Issuer: Carlyle Infrastructure Credit Fund II, L.P. CIK: 0001984761 SEC File Number: 021-500163 Entity Type: Limited Partnership Jurisdiction: Delaware Year Organized: 2023 Principal Fund Address: One Vanderbilt Avenue, Suite 3400, New York, NY 10017 Fund Phone: 212-813-4900 Carlyle Headquarters: 1001 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20004 First Sale: December 22, 2023 Latest Form D Amendment Identified: January 5, 2026 Fund Classification: Pooled Investment Fund / Private Equity Fund Offering Exemption: Regulation D Rule 506(b) Investment Company Act Exclusion: Section 3(c)(7) Offering Duration: More Than One Year Offering Size: Indefinite Form D Amount Sold as of January 5, 2026: $1,006,273,135 Form D Investors as of January 5, 2026: 3 Form D Minimum Investment: $0 Sales Commissions: $0 Finder's Fees: $0 Final Close Announced: September 14, 2026 Final Total Capital Commitments: Approximately $2.3 billion Original Fundraising Target: $2.0 billion Fund II Size Versus Predecessor: More Than Three Times Larger Portfolio at Final Close: 6 investments Capital Committed to Portfolio at Final Close: Approximately $500 million Geographic Portfolio Exposure at Final Close: North America and Europe Investor Geography: North America; Europe; Asia General Partner: CICF II General Partner, L.P. General Partner of GP: CICF II, L.L.C. Related Authorized Person / Form D Signatory: David Lobe Other Related Persons: Kristen Newville; Christina von Poelnitz Affiliated Distribution Entity: TCG Capital Markets L.L.C. TCG Capital Markets CRD: 291767 Sales Solicitation Geography: All U.S. States Employee Fundraising Compensation: Carlyle states certain affiliate employees may be compensated partly based on capital raised; compensation is borne by Carlyle rather than fund investors Strategy: Directly Originated Private Infrastructure Credit Credit Spectrum: Investment Grade; Below Investment Grade; Mezzanine Fund II Primary Focus: Below-Investment-Grade Infrastructure Credit / Relative Value Key Sectors: Energy Transition; Digital Infrastructure; Transportation & Logistics; Low-Carbon Power; Water & Waste; Telecom; Essential / Social Infrastructure Infrastructure Credit Global Head: Erik Savi Deputy Global Head: Manish Taneja Other Senior Infrastructure Credit Professional: Nikola Simic Infrastructure Credit Dedicated Professionals: 17 as of June 30, 2026 Infrastructure Credit AUM June 30, 2026: Approximately $7.7 billion Infrastructure Credit AUM Reported September 2026: Approximately $8.7 billion Infrastructure Credit Capital Deployed Since 2019 at June 30, 2026: Approximately $5.1 billion Carlyle Global Credit AUM: Approximately $211.1 billion as of June 30, 2026 Carlyle Global Credit Fee-Earning AUM: Approximately $167.6 billion Carlyle Global Private Equity AUM: Approximately $162.7 billion Carlyle AlpInvest AUM: Approximately $111.7 billion Total Carlyle AUM: Approximately $485.5 billion as of June 30, 2026 Carlyle Employees: 2,500+ Carlyle Offices: 28 Carlyle Founded: 1987 Carlyle Founders: Bill Conway; Dan D'Aniello; David Rubenstein Current Carlyle CEO: Harvey M. Schwartz Global Credit Leadership: Mark Jenkins, Co-President and Head of Global Credit & Insurance Parent Company: The Carlyle Group Inc. Parent Ticker: NASDAQ: CG Parent CIK: 0001527166 Carlyle Investment Management SEC File: 801-52462 Carlyle Investment Management CRD: 111128 Representative Current Digital Infrastructure Theme: Data Centers; Fiber; Telecommunications Representative Current Energy Themes: Renewables; Energy Transition; Low-Carbon Power; Utilities; Energy Stability Representative Current Essential Infrastructure Themes: Water/Waste; Transportation; Social Infrastructure Fund II Current Complete Portfolio Names: Not publicly disclosed in reviewed final-close announcement Current Fund II Audited Net IRR: Not publicly disclosed Current Fund II DPI / TVPI: Not meaningfully mature / not publicly disclosed Current Fund II Loan-to-Value: Not publicly disclosed Current Gross Yield: Not publicly disclosed Current Default / Non-Accrual Rate: Not publicly disclosed Current Fund-Level Leverage: Requires fund documents Current Management Fee / Carry: Requires CICF II LPA; do not automatically apply Carlyle general fund economics Current Auditor: Requires confirmation from CICF II audited financial statements Current Administrator: Requires confirmation Current Custodian / Banking Structure: Requires confirmation Current Legal Counsel: Requires confirmation Major Platform Regulatory Event: January 13, 2025 SEC off-channel communications / recordkeeping settlement Carlyle Entities in 2025 Settlement: Carlyle Investment Management L.L.C.; Carlyle Global Credit Investment Management L.L.C.; AlpInvest Partners B.V. Combined Civil Penalty: $8.5 million Nature of 2025 SEC Case: Books-and-records preservation and supervision involving off-channel communications Important Enforcement Distinction: The settlement was not a finding that CICF II committed fraud or misappropriated investor assets Primary Risks: Below-investment-grade default risk; construction risk; refinancing risk; interest-rate risk; private valuation; data-center/AI demand risk; energy-transition policy risk; collateral impairment; project concentration; long-duration illiquidity; currency/geographic exposure; fund-scale deployment pressure; affiliated-account allocation conflicts; fund-level leverage and fee drag Entity Confusion Warning: Do not confuse CICF II with Carlyle Private Equity Partners Fund, Carlyle AlpInvest funds, Carlyle BDCs, Carlyle aviation funds or Carlyle equity infrastructure vehicles; they belong to the same Carlyle platform but are different legal and economic strategies. Duplicate Brand Rule: Carlyle Infrastructure Credit Fund II and its related parallel/note/feeder vehicles belong to the broader Carlyle brand. For FilingDossier's brand-level sequential generation, Carlyle should now be treated as completed; later Carlyle vehicles should be skipped unless the user specifically requests a strategy that warrants a separate review. Independent Conclusion: Carlyle Infrastructure Credit Fund II is a highly verifiable institutional private-credit fund whose January 2026 SEC Form D reported approximately $1.006 billion sold and whose September 2026 final close reached approximately $2.3 billion of commitments. It operates inside an infrastructure credit platform of roughly $8.7 billion and a Carlyle organization managing approximately $485 billion. The fund's legitimacy and manager relationship are exceptionally strong; the material diligence questions concern underwriting discipline, deployment pace, default and recovery risk, infrastructure project execution, fees, leverage, conflicts and realized investment performance.
Independent research summary based on SEC Form D, Carlyle SEC corporate filings, Form ADV-related records, Carlyle Infrastructure Credit disclosures, Carlyle Global Credit materials and SEC enforcement records. Form D, SEC adviser registration, Carlyle's public-company status and institutional fundraising do not constitute SEC approval, validation of fund performance or a guarantee of investor returns.